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INTRODUCTION
The Model Penal Code had inspired penal law reform
in over thirty states by the early 1980’s, according to its
* Professor of Law, S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo.  Thanks to Markus Dubber, Paul
Robinson, Robert Weisberg, and James Wooten for helpful discussion, and to
Hisham Ramadan for research assistance.
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principal drafter, Herbert Wechsler.1  One of the Model
Penal Code’s most influential features is said to be the
scheme of culpable mental states developed in its general
part.2  This scheme distinguishes and defines mental states
and associates these mental states with particular conduct,
circumstance, and result elements of offenses and defenses.
This scheme is designed to clarify the mental element of
each offense and defense and to create options intermediate
between purpose and strict liability, while avoiding the
confusion created by the traditional terminology of general,
specific, transferred and presumed intent.  One important
feature of the Code’s general culpability scheme is a series
of default rules, designed to assign a culpable mental state
to every conduct, circumstance and result element of each
offense and defense.  As we shall see, these default rules
have been enacted in whole or in part in half of the
American states.
By contrast, one of the Code’s least influential features
is said to be its near abolition of the traditional felony
murder rule in its special part.  As part of the Code’s
general disfavoring of strict liability and criminal
negligence, the Code conditioned murder liability for killing
in the course of crime on recklessness and extreme
indifference to human life, thereby assimilating it into
other forms of unintentional murder. In so doing, the
Code’s drafters rejected what they understood to be the
felony murder rule’s imposition of “a form of strict liability
for . . . homicide.”3 It is commonly said that almost every
state in the country has retained some form of the felony
murder rule and so repudiated the Model Penal Code’s
1. See Herbert Wechsler, Foreword to 2 Model Penal Code and
Commentaries, at xi (1980).
2. See George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 Sw. U. L. Rev.
413, 414 (1981) (“The Model Penal Code has stimulated an extraordinary level of
legislative activity.  In the last two decades thirty-four states have adopted at
least some portion of the recommendations embodied in the Model Code.  The
most popular provisions are those defining the four kinds of culpability. . . .”).
3. Model Penal Code § 210.1, pt. II cmt. at 5 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980).
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proposed reform.4
This article is about the relationship between these
two features of the Model Penal Code—that is, between the
Code’s culpability scheme and its rejection of the felony
murder rule.  It is also about the apparently inconsistent
legislative response to these two features of the Code.  The
article’s premise is that the Model Penal Code’s treatment
of the felony murder issue flows from its general culpability
scheme.  That scheme demands culpability for serious
crimes like murder. Hence to adopt the general culpability
scheme while continuing to embrace the felony murder
rule, as traditionally understood, is inconsistent at the
level of principle.
But it is not entirely clear whether legislatures have
adopted this inconsistent position, because the default
rules may alter the meaning of previously enacted felony
murder provisions.  Thus, in adopting the Model Penal
Code’s general culpability scheme while substantially
retaining their previous statutory definitions of felony
murder, some legislatures have created a difficult problem
of statutory interpretation.  The problem arises from the
fact that while felony murder has often been understood as
a strict liability offense, statutory definitions of felony
murder have traditionally been silent as to its mental
element.  In retaining their traditionally laconic definitions
4. See Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its
Processes 479 (6th ed. 1995) (“Despite the substantial influence of the Model
Penal Code in other areas, it has had a smaller measure of success here: Only
New Hampshire adopted the Model Penal Code’s formulation . . . ; very few
legislatures went further and abolished the doctrine. . . .”); Joshua Dressler,
Understanding Criminal Law 479 (2d ed. 1995) (“The rule is richly criticized in
this country.  Nonetheless, the rule ‘still thrives’ in the United States, and is
retained in some form in nearly every state jurisdiction.”).  Fletcher argues:
Of all the reforms proposed by the Model Penal Code, perhaps none has
been less influential than the Model Penal Code’s recommendation on the
perennial problem of felony-murder. . . .  Not a single state has adopted the
Model Penal Code’s proposed reformulation of the felony murder rule. . . .
By and large . . . the states that have reformed their criminal codes since
1960 have, first, ignored the recommendations of the Model Penal Code
and, second, retained the felony-murder rule as a criterion of liability for
the highest degree of criminal homicide.
Fletcher, supra note 2, at 415.
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of felony murder, legislatures may have thought they were
retaining a strict liability offense.  Yet in adopting default
culpability rules, legislatures may have unwittingly—and
unwillingly—reformed the law of felony murder by
introducing mental elements.
Thus, one of the purposes of this article is to clarify the
law of felony murder in the many states that have adopted
some version of the Model Penal Code’s default rules.  Have
states that retained their traditional statutory definitions
of felony murder thereby retained felony murder as a strict
liability offense in defiance of the Model Penal Code?  Or
have they redefined felony murder as a crime of culpability
through the Model Penal Code’s default rules?  This
question is complicated, however, by the fact that courts
also may have simply overlooked the applicability of
default culpability rules to felony murder provisions.  Thus
we may have to conclude that in some jurisdictions, the
elements of felony murder remain to be defined.
To better understand the interpretive problem created
by the incorporation of default rules into a code that retains
a felony murder rule, let us imagine a code containing the
following two provisions:
(1)  Criminal liability for an offense requires culpability
with respect to every element of that offense. Should the
statute defining an offense specify no required culpable
mental state with respect to a particular element, the
required culpable mental state for that element shall be
intent.
(2)  Any actor causing the death of a human being in the
commission of a felony shall be held strictly liable for
murder.
These two provisions flatly contradict one another,
generating textual indeterminacy. Which provision
controls: the general one, or the specific one?  Does it make
any difference if one is later in time?
Now consider a code containing provision (1), but
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containing the following modified definition of felony
murder:
(2)(a) Any actor causing the death of a human being in the
commission of a felony shall be liable for murder.
This provision is a simplified version of the definitions
of felony murder found in many codes.  These definitions
have often been interpreted to predicate felony murder on
strict liability, but in fact are merely silent as to mental
culpability.  The deletion of “strictly” from provision (2)
appears to remove the contradiction and the resultant
ambiguity because the new felony murder provision, (2)(a),
no longer clearly imposes strict liability.  Since provision
(2)(a) specifies no mental state, provision (1) appears to
control, and so to condition murder liability on
intentionally causing death in the course of a felony.
But conceivably, a court could simply ignore provision
(1) and impose strict liability anyway, because felony
murder has traditionally been understood as a crime of
strict liability.  It might treat provision (1) as merely
hortatory rhetoric, or as relevant only to the construction of
provisions defining new offenses, rather than those
previously defined by common law precedent.  Or, a court
might reason that when a felon causes death accidentally
in the course of a felony, culpability “transfers” from the
intended (felonious) harm to the unintended death.  The
court might add that this “transferred” culpability is one
traditional meaning of “malice,” the mental element of
murder at common law.  By these means, a court might
conclude that holding a felon strictly liable for an
accidental death caused in the course of a felony complies
with the general requirement of culpability in provision (1).
Of course, this kind of transferred intent is not what the
drafters of the Model Penal Code meant by “culpability”
with respect to every element.  But courts may
misunderstand or resist the Model Penal Code’s culpability
scheme.
For another example of this problem, let us now
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introduce a clear statement exception into the requirement
of culpability  in provision (1):
(1)(a) Criminal liability for an offense requires culpability
with respect to every element of that offense, unless strict
liability is clearly imposed by the provision defining the
offense.
Once again, there appears to be no ambiguity.  Since
felony murder provision (2)(a) does not clearly impose strict
liability, it would appear to fall outside the clear statement
exception in (1)(a).  But if felony murder has traditionally
been understood as a crime of strict liability, an interpreter
might conclude that the felony murder provision (2)(a) does
“clearly impose” strict liability.
These hypothetical examples illustrate the tension
between a general requirement of culpability backed by
default culpability standards, and the received expectation
that felony murder rule will be a strict liability offense.  A
legislature borrowing the Model Penal Code’s general
culpability scheme might be unaware of its implications for
the felony murder rule.  Hence, we face the arresting
possibility that some legislatures that declined to follow the
Model Penal Code’s approach to felony murder in the
special part may have nevertheless abolished or
dramatically reformed felony murder through the general
part.  And just as a legislature might not notice or
understand this implication of adopting a general
culpability scheme, a court might not notice it either.
This is the paradoxical situation explored in this
article. The paradox is important in its own right, in
clarifying the law of felony murder in many jurisdictions,
and in informing the continuing controversy over the
legitimacy of the felony murder rule.  But it is also
important in that it points to a more general issue
concerning the Model Penal Code that is the subject of this
symposium.  For it points to the possibility that forty years
after the Code was drafted, the bench and bar still have not
fully assimilated the idea of a criminal statute as a
comprehensive and systematic code, with a general part
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governing the structure and definitions of specific offenses.
The article will begin with a brief clarification of the
felony murder rule and the claims that such a rule is
rejected by the Model Penal Code but nevertheless retained
by the states.  It will then proceed to explicate the Model
Penal Code default rules and the Model Penal Code’s
approach to felony murder.  Next it will delineate the scope
of the problem by surveying default rules in the states.  It
will then examine felony murder provisions in these default
rule states.  It will analyze the options open to courts in
interpreting these felony murder provisions in light of the
default rules and, finally, it will examine the performance
of the few courts that have confronted the question of the
implications of default culpability rules for felony murder.
The article will conclude that while several
legislatures and a few courts have understood the
applicability of default culpability standards to felony
murder provisions, most have not.  As a result, there are
several states in which the mental element of felony
murder is uncertain.  In states that have adopted a default
culpability standard of negligence, the application of
default culpability standards will generally involve little
real change in the law, because most states already limit
felony murder liability to felonies that inherently impose
an unreasonable risk of death.  However, in some states
that have adopted more exacting default culpability
standards—Alaska, Pennsylvania, North Dakota, and
Delaware, possibly Kansas and Missouri—dutiful
application of that standard will more dramatically alter
the law of felony murder.
I. THE FELONY MURDER RULE
What is the felony murder rule? There is a great deal
of confusion over this question, which makes it hard to
assess claims like “the states retain the felony murder rule”
or “the Model Penal Code rejects the felony murder rule.”
The problem of assigning a definite meaning to the term
“felony murder rule” is illustrated by the following typical
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discussion from Samuel Pillsbury’s fine new book on
homicide:
In its simplest form, the felony murder rule holds that an
individual is guilty of murder, regardless of actual attitude
or intent toward killing, if in the course of committing a
particular felony he causes another’s death.  To take the
most common example, if a robber kills another in the
course of a robbery, he will be liable for felony murder even
if the killing is entirely accidental. . . . In the United States,
the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions retain the felony
murder doctrine, subject to a variety of restrictions.  Some
limit the underlying felonies to a short list specified by
statute, others to those offenses inherently dangerous, and
still other jurisdictions according to whether the felonies are
dangerous in the way committed by defendants.5
Here is the difficulty posed by this description:
Imagine a statute that conditions first degree murder on
killing recklessly in the course of a felony and that
conditions second degree murder on killing negligently in
the course of a felony.  Would these two offenses satisfy
Pillsbury’s definition of the felony murder rule?  On the one
hand, they impose liability “regardless of . . . intent toward
killing,” but on the other hand, they don’t allow liability for
an “entirely accidental killing.”
Next, ask yourself how different are these offenses
from felony murder as “restricted” in “the overwhelming
majority of U.S. jurisdictions.”  If  felony murder requires a
death proximately caused by a felonious act dangerous to
human life, it requires negligence, at least.  And if the
danger to human life is very great and very apparent, the
death would satisfy some definitions of recklessness.6
Felony murder decisions that hold that “accidental” killings
in the course of robbery meet the felony murder rule are
very often cases in which a defendant alleges that he shot
5. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Judging Evil: Rethinking the Law of Murder and
Manslaughter 106, 108 (1998).
6. See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902 (Mass. 1944) (“grave
danger to others must have been apparent”).
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the victim “accidentally” while menacing a vital part of the
victim’s body with a loaded gun.7  Such a shooting is
plausibly described as reckless, although it could also be
described as merely negligent, on the notion that a
defendant threatening to shoot a victim could be unaware
of the risk that someone would get shot.
Thus, while discussions of the felony murder rule often
say it punishes accidental rather than intentional killings
in the course of a felony, in most states it punishes killings
which are neither intentional nor accidental, but negligent,
or possibly reckless.  In many of these states, a reckless
killing for an antisocial purpose is classified as “extreme
indifference” murder, usually murder in the second degree.
In such states, felony murder may  simply be a category of
extreme indifference murder, or it may serve to upgrade
some extreme indifference murders to murder in the first
degree.
So we can distinguish at least three possible
approaches to killing in the course of crime:
(1) Punish it as murder if accompanied by the same mental
culpability characterizing other forms of murder.
(2) Punish it as murder if accompanied by a lesser level of
culpability than that characterizing other forms of murder.
(3) Punish it as murder per se regardless of mental
culpability.
The felony murder rule has traditionally been equated with
approach three, but most American felony murder
provisions are in fact applied along the lines of approach
two.  Hence, I would argue that either of these latter two
approaches count as variants of the “felony murder rule”
but that approach one does not.
7. See, e.g., State v. Humphrey, 351 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1986); State v.
Hottle, 476 S.E.2d 200 (W. Va. 1996).
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By these criteria, the American Law Institute’s Model
Penal Code did not retain the felony murder rule.  It
instead conditioned felony murder on recklessness and
extreme indifference to human life, which are typically
indicia of second degree murder.  And by these criteria, the
great majority of  American jurisdictions have probably
retained the felony murder rule by effectively conditioning
felony murder on negligence rather than recklessness.
II.  THE MODEL PENAL CODE SCHEME
A. The Default Rule Scheme
To understand the Model Penal Code’s approach to
felony murder, it is first necessary to review its general
interpretive  scheme for assigning culpability to criminal
offenses.  This consists of the following five principles:
1. The Code defines  “material elements” as including any
conduct, circumstance, or result defining an offense or
defense of justification or excuse.8
2. The Code permits no strict liability with respect to any
material element of a serious offense.9 Every material
8. Model Penal Code §§ 1.113(9), 1.13(10) (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985).
9. Because some symposium participants expressed incredulity that the Code
really forbade strict liability for all serious offenses I must, with apologies,
belabor this important point.
Model Penal Code Section 2.02(1) provides:
Minimum Requirements of Culpability: Except as provided in Section 2.05,
a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly,
recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each
material element of the offense.
Model Penal Code § 2.02(1) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
Model Penal Code Section 2.05 provides:
(1) The requirements of culpability prescribed by . . . section 2.02 do not
apply to (a) offenses which constitute violations . . . or (b) offenses defined
by statutes other than the Code, insofar as a legislative purpose to impose
absolute liability for such offenses or with respect to any material element
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thereof plainly appears.  (2) [u]nless a subsequent statute otherwise
provides: (a) when absolute liability is imposed . . . with respect to any
material element of an offense defined by a statute other than the Code
and a conviction is based upon such liability, the offense constitutes a
violation.
Id. § 2.05(1).
Thus the Code permits strict liability only for offenses defined as
violations in the Code, and permits strict liability offenses clearly defined as such
outside the Code to be punished only as violations unless a subsequent statute
requires otherwise.  The Comment to Section 2.02 (Part I,  Sections 1.01 to 2.13 p.
229) states:
This section expresses the Code’s basic requirement that unless some
element of mental culpability is required with respect to each material
element of the offense, no valid criminal conviction may be obtained.  This
requirement is subordinated only to the provision of Section 2.05 for a
narrow class of strict liability offenses that are limited to those for which
no severer sentence than a fine may be imposed.
Id. § 2.02 cmt. at 229.
The Comment to Section 2.05  is similarly unambiguous:
This section makes a frontal attack on absolute or strict liability in the
penal law, whenever the offense carries the possibility of criminal
conviction, for which a sentence of probation or imprisonment may be
imposed.  The method used is . . . to provide that when conviction rests
upon that basis the grade of the offense is reduced to a violation, which is
not a ‘crime’ and . . . may result in no sentence other than a fine, or . . .
forfeiture or other authorized civil penalty.  This position is affirmed not
only with respect to offenses defined by the penal code; it is superimposed
on the entire corpus of the law so far as penal sanctions are involved. . . .
The institute did not doubt that principle is one that should be given force.
The liabilities involved are indefensible unless reduced to terms that
insulate conviction from the type of moral condemnation that is and ought
to be implicit when a sentence of probation or imprisonment may be
imposed. . . . This is too fundamental to be compromised.
Id. § 2.05 cmt. at 282-83.
The Drafters of the Code did, by their own admission, violate this
proscription of strict liability in one instance.  Section 213.6(a) provides strict
liability with respect to the attendant circumstance of the victim’s age for sex
offenses against children under the age of ten.  The rationale for this exception
would appear to be that chronological age is a proxy for immaturity and
incapacity to give meaningful consent. Presumably even an offender who made a
reasonable mistake about the precise chronological age of a child under ten could
not reasonably believe that the child was mature enough to consent to sex.  In
this sense, conditioning sex offenses on a very young age establishes a per se
negligence rule.  For sex offenses conditioned on higher victim ages, the code
requires at least negligence with respect to age.  The Comment to section 213.6
(Part II Sections 210.0 to 213.6 pp. 412-417) states:
Subsection (1) of Section 213.6 states an exception to the general
culpability provisions of Section 2.02.  Liability for intercourse with a child
less than 10 years old requires no mental state with respect to the child’s
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element therefore must be accompanied by a culpable
mental state, whether or not that culpable mental state is
specified in the statute.  Let us call this the pervasive
culpability requirement.
3. These culpable mental states are divided into purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. Each of the
culpable mental states in this list includes all that follow.10
This arrangement of lesser included culpable mental states
is sometimes referred to as the stacking rule.
age. . . .  As a general proposition, one would expect that honest and
reasonable mistake as to the critical element of an offense would negate
liability. . . . [But traditionally] statutory rape has been a strict liability
offense. . . .  Disallowance of mistake as to age probably relates to the
common-law definition of rape as including consensual intercourse with a
girl less than 10 years old.  Focus on so young an age made strict liability
tolerable, for no credible error regarding the age of a child in fact less than
10 years old would render the actor’s conduct anything less than a
dramatic departure from societal norms. . . [or] would be sufficient to
recharacterize a child of such tender years as an appropriate object of
sexual gratification.  Of course, it is debatable whether the rule of strict
liability is satisfactory even in this circumstance. . . . The Model Penal
Code effects a compromise between the traditional rule disallowing mistake
in the law  of statutory rape and a general policy against strict liability
crimes. . . . It was thought that strict liability would be acceptable for
offenses based on such extreme youth and that in any event any proposed
change on this point would encounter political resistance.
Model Penal Code §  213.6 cmt. at 412-17 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
What is the significance of section 213.6(1)?  On the one hand, the drafters
designate it as an exception to section 2.02 which reinforces the conclusion that
section 2.02 ordinarily precludes strict liability.  On the other hand, if one
exception can be created, why not others?  One way to reconcile section 213.6(1)
with section 2.02 is to see section 213.6(1) as an exception to the Code’s method of
defining offense elements and culpable mental states, rather than an exception to
the principle that every inculpating circumstance must be attended by mental
culpability.  Another response is to acknowledge that section 213.6(1) violates
2.02(1), but deny that this changes the clearly stated meaning of section 2.02.  On
this interpretation, section 2.02(1) and section 213.6 simply contradict each other,
like provisions (1) and (2) of the hypothetical code discussed above in the
introduction.
10. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(5) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
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4. When the statutory definition specifies a culpable mental
state for the offense as a whole, the Code applies that
culpable mental state to all material elements.11  Let us call
this the distributive default rule.
5. When the statutory definition specifies no culpable
mental state, the Code applies recklessness to all material
elements.12  Let us call this the recklessness default rule.
It should be noted that the pervasive culpability
requirement has two aspects.  It is, first, a principle of
drafting that forbids the integration into the Code of any
strict liability offense that can give rise to imprisonment.
Second, it is a default rule that applies to offense and
defense definitions that fail to assign a culpable mental
state to every material element.  This pervasive culpability
default rule requires interpreters to assign a culpable
mental state of at least negligence for every material
element that is not explicitly assigned a corresponding
mental state. Some state codes adopt a pervasive
culpability requirement with a clear statement exception.
The clear statement exception effectively reduces the
pervasive culpability requirement to a pervasive culpability
default rule only, and avoids the M.P.C.’s absolute
proscription of strict liability offenses.  Some state codes
adopt a culpability requirement for all offenses, but do not
explicitly require that a culpable mental state be assigned
to every material element.  We may call such a
requirement a nonpervasive culpability requirement.  Such
11. Section § 2.02(4) provides:
Prescribed Culpability Requirement Applies to All Material Elements.
When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is
sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among
the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material
elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.
Id. § 2.02(4).
12. See id. § 2.02(3) (“Culpability Required Unless Otherwise Provided.  When
the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not
prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely,
knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.”).
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a requirement has some implications for interpreting
offense definitions that fail to specify the culpable mental
states assigned to particular elements.  It clearly requires
that at least one element be assigned a culpable mental
state, but it might be read to support assigning every
element a culpable mental state.  Thus, we can refer to the
nonpervasive culpability requirement as a nonpervasive
culpability default rule, of uncertain significance.
B. The Felony Murder Scheme
The Code’s approach to felony murder is defined by
four additional principles:
1. The Code defines criminal homicide as causing death
with purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence.13  We
may call this the homicide culpability requirement,
requiring at least negligence with respect to the causation of
death for all homicide offenses. This requirement implies a
homicide default rule, which would assign a mental
culpability of at least negligence to homicide offenses
specifying no culpable mental state with respect to the
causation of death.
2. Murder is defined as a form of criminal homicide14 and
includes causing death “recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life.”15
3. These mental states are “presumed” when the defendant
or an accomplice commits or attempts robbery, rape,
burglary, arson, kidnapping, or escape.16
13. Id. § 210.1(1) (“A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causes the death of another human being.”).
14. Id. § 210.1(2) (“Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter, or negligent
homicide.”).
15. Id. § 210.2(1)(b).
16. Id.
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4. These “presumptions” permit the jury to find the
requisite mental states proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
but do not require the jury to so find. In addition, the jury
remains obliged to consider countervailing evidence that
might give rise to reasonable doubt about the defendant’s
recklessness and extreme indifference.17
This scheme collapses felony murder into gross
recklessness murder, and treats the commission of an
enumerated dangerous felony as prima facie evidence of
gross recklessness.  By conditioning felony murder liability
on a type of mental culpability defining ordinary murder
the Code abolishes the felony murder rule. 
Note, however, that even without this explicit
requirement of extreme indifference to human life,  the
code could abolish the felony murder rule through its
default rules.  The crucial rules are the pervasive
culpability requirement, the homicide default rule, and the
recklessness default rule. The pervasive culpability
requirement would prevent the inclusion in the Code of a
provision explicitly defining felony murder as a crime of
strict liability with respect to causation of death.  If the
code included a felony murder provision silent as to mens
rea, the homicide default rule and the pervasive culpability
default rule would both require a culpable mental state of
at least negligence with respect to this element.  The
recklessness default rule would go further and require a
culpable mental state of recklessness.  Since recklessly
risking death for a very antisocial purpose such as the
commission of a dangerous felony would satisfy many
definitions of extreme indifference to human life,18 such an
17. Id. § 1.12(5).  When the Code establishes a presumption with respect to
any fact that is an element of an offense, it has the following consequences: (a)
where there is evidence of the facts that give rise to the presumption, the issue of
the existence of the presumed fact must be given to the jury, unless the court is
satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly negatives the presumed fact; and (b)
when the issue of the existence of the presumed fact is submitted to the jury, the
court shall charge that while the presumed fact must, on all the evidence, be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the law declares that the jury may regard the
facts giving rise to the presumption as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact.
18. See, e.g., Mayes v. People, 106 Ill. 306 (Ill. 1883); People v. Protopappas
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approach would again collapse felony murder into extreme
indifference murder.  In states conditioning first degree
murder on causing death in the commission of a dangerous
felony, the felony murder rule would do nothing more than
raise second to first degree murder.  In codes without a
degree structure, or in codes that condition first degree
murder on purposeful killing, the Model Penal Code’s
default rules would eliminate the felony murder rule
altogether, or reduce it to merely one way of defining
extreme indifference murder.
Suppose a state adopted the pervasive culpability
default rule, and the homicide default rule, but not the
recklessness default rule.  What would be the effect on
felony murder liability?  Felony murder liability would be
conditioned on at least negligence.  As I have already
explained, since felony murder is almost always
conditioned on causing death in the course of an act
foreseeably dangerous to life, it almost always involves at
least negligence as a matter of course anyway.
Nevertheless, the pervasive culpability default rule and the
homicide default rule would both seem to require charging
a jury that they must find negligence in order to convict of
felony murder.  Thus, both rules function as negligence
default rules.
What if, in the alternative, a code were to include the
recklessness default rule but no pervasive culpability
default rule?  This could conceivably  leave open the
question of whether recklessness should apply to all
material elements or only some (although Section 2.02(3) is
drafted in such a way as to preclude the latter
interpretation).  Courts in such a jurisdiction would have
the option of interpreting a felony murder provision to
require no culpability with respect to a resulting death, as
long as the predicate felony was a crime of recklessness,
knowledge or purpose.19  This interpretation of the default
246 Cal. Rptr. 915 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
19. Actually, the applicability of a recklessness default rule to felony murder
depends on how the felony murder provision is written.  Consider a provision that
defines as murder, “causing death in the commission or attempt of a forcible
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rule scheme becomes less plausible, however, if the code
also includes the distributive rule.  The distributive rule is
usually formulated so as to distribute to all material
elements any culpable mental state specified for the offense
as a whole in the provision defining the offense.  Thus, it
does not explicitly mandate distributing implied culpable
mental states, nor does it, by its own terms require a
culpable mental state for every material element.
Nevertheless, these interpretive practices seem consistent
with the spirit and purpose of the distributive rule.  It
makes little sense to distribute specified culpable mental
states to every element without also distributing implied
culpable mental states.
What if a state has adopted the pervasive culpability
default rule, but not the pervasive culpability requirement?
Such a state could make felony murder a strict liability
crime as long as it did so explicitly.  A felony murder
provision that was silent on this question would have to be
interpreted as requiring at least negligence. But as we saw
in the introduction, courts might nevertheless interpret
such felony murder provisions as defining strict liability
offenses out of habit.
Another possibility is that a state might adopt a
nonpervasive culpability requirement.  This rule functions
as a nonpervasive negligence default rule that might or
might not be construed to require negligent causation of
death in the felony murder context.
felony.”  The conduct element of this statute is an act causing death and the
felony would appear to be an attendant circumstance.  If the defendant is
required to be at least reckless with respect to one of these elements, he must be
at least reckless either as to whether he is in fact committing the act which
causes death (shooting a gun, startling an elderly victim), whether death will
result, or whether he is committing the predicate forcible felony.  It may be
argued that section 2.02(2)(c) defines recklessness so as to apply only to
circumstance and result elements, not to act elements.  If so, defendant must be
reckless with respect to either death or the commission or attempt of the felony.
Thus technically, the mens rea associated with the predicate felony does not
matter, so long as the defendant is aware of a substantial risk of death or of a
substantial risk that he is committing or attempting the predicate felony and
(arguably) that it is a “forcible” felony.  This result raises complex questions about
mistake of law and the mens rea of accomplice liability for felony murder.
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One further issue in the application of the Model Penal
Code’s default rules concerns culpable mental states which
are not specified but are instead implied in the definition of
conduct or even circumstance elements.  Is negligence
implied in “proximately causing” or “foreseeably causing”
death?  Is negligence implied in the “commission” of a
felony “dangerous to human life?”  It might be argued that
the recklessness default rule does not apply to these
conduct and circumstance elements, because they have
already been assigned culpable mental states by
implication.  Some jurisdictions have adopted a provision
that an offense definition specifying no culpable mental
state may nevertheless require one if the proscribed
conduct “necessarily involves” a culpable mental state.20
We may call this the necessarily involved culpability rule.
III.  DEFAULT RULES IN THE STATES
A total of 25 states have adopted some version of the
Code’s default rules.
Three states, Kansas, Missouri and New Jersey, have
adopted intent (as opposed to recklessness) default rules.
Of  these three, Kansas has adopted an intent default rule
and a nonpervasive requirement of either recklessness or
intent for almost all felonies. 21 New Jersey has adopted a
20. For example, the New York Penal Law provides:
Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute
defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required
for the commission of such offense, or with respect to some or all of the
material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves a
culpable mental state. . . .
N.Y. Penal Law § 15.15(2)(McKinney 1998).
21. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3201 (1981):
Criminal intent. (a) Except as otherwise provided, a criminal intent is an
essential element of every crime defined by this code. Criminal intent may
be established by proof that the conduct of the accused person was
intentional or reckless. Proof of intentional conduct shall be required to
establish criminal intent, unless the statute defining the crime expressly
provides that the prohibited act is criminal if done in a reckless manner.
See also Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3204 (1981):
Guilt without criminal intent, when. A person may be guilty of an offense
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pervasive culpability requirement with a clear purpose
exception and a knowledge default rule,22 and has also
adopted the distributive,23 necessarily involved
culpability,24 and homicide default rules.25  Missouri, which
accepts purpose or knowledge as default mental states,26
also has adopted what appears to be a pervasive culpability
rule for felonies and misdemeanors, requiring culpability
for the conduct, circumstance, or result elements which
constitute the material elements of the offense.27 There are
without having criminal intent if the crime is a misdemeanor, cigarette or
tobacco infraction or traffic infraction and the statute defining the offense
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the
conduct described; or a violation of K.S.A. 8-1567 or 8-1567A and
amendments thereto.
22.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-2 (West 1998) (“Minimum requirements of
culpability.  Except as provided in subsection c. (3) of this section, a person is not
guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or
negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the
offense.”); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-2 c. (3) (“A statute defining a crime,
unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, should be
construed as defining a crime with the culpability defined in paragraph b. (2) of
this section [knowledge].  This provision applies to offenses both inside and
outside the code.”).
23. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-2 c. (1) (West 1998) (“When the law defining an
offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of
an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such
provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary
purpose plainly appears.”).
24. See id. § 2C:2-2 c. (3) (“Although no culpable mental state is expressly
designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may
nevertheless be required for the commission of such offense, or with respect to all
or some material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves
such culpable mental state.”).
25. See id. § 2C:11-5 a. (“A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or, under the circumstances set forth in section
2C: 11-5 [causing death by reckless driving], causes the death of a human being.
b.  Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or death by auto.”).
26. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 562.021 (1999):
3. Except as provided in subsection 2 of this section and section 562.026, if
the definition of any offense does not expressly prescribe a culpable mental
state for any elements of the offense, a culpable mental state is nonetheless
required and is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly; but
reckless or criminally negligent acts do not establish such culpable mental
state.
27. See id. § 562.016:
Culpable mental state.  1. Except as provided in section 562.026, a person
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two exceptions, however.  Missouri’s Code permits strict
liability where “imputation of a culpable mental state is
clearly inconsistent with the purpose of the statute defining
the offense or may lead to an absurd or unjust result.”28
Missouri has also adopted the distributive rule when a
culpable mental state is assigned to an offense generally,
but has added that when a culpable mental state is
assigned to some particular elements, the rest require no
mental culpability.29
A total of eleven states have adopted recklessness
default rules in some form.  Hawaii,30  Pennsylvania,31 and
is not guilty of an offense unless he acts with a culpable mental state, that
is, unless he acts purposely or knowingly or recklessly or with criminal
negligence, as the statute defining the offense may require with respect to
the conduct, the result thereof or the attendant circumstances which
constitute the material elements of the crime.
28. Id. § 562.026:
Culpable mental state, when not required.  A culpable mental state is not
required: (1) If the offense is an infraction and no culpable mental state is
prescribed by the statute defining the offense; or (2) If the offense is a
felony or misdemeanor and no culpable mental state is prescribed by the
statute defining the offense, and imputation of a culpable mental state to
the offense is clearly inconsistent with the purpose of the statute defining
the offense or may lead to an absurd or unjust result.
29. See id. § 562.021:
Culpable mental state, application.  1. If the definition of any offense
prescribes a culpable mental state but does not specify the conduct,
attendant circumstances or result to which it applies, the prescribed
culpable mental state applies to each such material element. 2. If the
definition of an offense prescribes a culpable mental state with regard to a
particular element or elements of that offense, the prescribed culpable
mental state shall be required only as to specified element or elements, and
a culpable mental state shall not be required as to any other element of the
offense.
30. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 702-204 (1993):
Except as provided in section 702-212, a person is not guilty of an offense
unless the person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently,
as the law specifies, with respect to each element of the offense. When the
state of mind required to establish an element of an offense is not specified
by the law, that element is established if, with respect thereto, a person
acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.
See also id. § 702-212:
The state of mind requirements prescribed by sections 702-204 and 702-207
through 702-211 do not apply to: (1) An offense which constitutes a
violation, unless the state of mind requirement involved is included in the
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Delaware32  have adopted the recklessness default rule, the
definition of the violation or a legislative purpose to impose such a
requirement plainly appears; or (2) A crime defined by statute other than
this Code, insofar as a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for
such offense or with respect to any element thereof plainly appears; § 702-
207. . . . When the definition of an offense specifies the state of mind
sufficient for the commission of that offense, without distinguishing among
the elements thereof, the specified state of mind shall apply to all elements
of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.
31. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 305 (1999):
Limitations on scope of culpability requirements:
(A) When culpability requirements are inapplicable to summary offenses
and to offenses defined by other statutes.— The requirements of culpability
prescribed by . . . section 302 of this title (relating to general requirements
of culpability) do not apply to: (1) summary offenses, unless the
requirement involved is included in  the definition of the offense or the
court determines that its application is consistent with effective
enforcement of the law defining the offense; or
(2) offenses defined by statutes other than this title, in so far as a
legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for such offenses or with
respect to any material element thereof plainly appears.
(B) Effect of absolute liability in reducing grade of offense to summary
offense.— Notwithstanding any other provision of existing law and unless a
subsequent statute otherwise provides: (1) when absolute liability is
imposed with respect to any material element of an offense defined by a
statute other than this title and a conviction is based upon such liability,
the offense constitutes a summary offense. . . .
See also id. § 302 (1999). General requirements of culpability:
(A) Minimum requirements of culpability.— Except as provided in section
305 of this title . . . a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require,
with respect to each material element of the offense. . . .
 (C) Culpability required unless otherwise provided.—When the culpability
sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by
law, such element is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly with respect thereto.
(D) Prescribed culpability requirement applies to all material elements.—
When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is
sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among
the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material
elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.
32. See Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11 § 251 (1998):
Proof of state of mind required unless otherwise provided; strict liability.
(a) No person may be found guilty of a criminal offense without proof that
the person had the state of mind required by the law defining the offense or
by subsection of this section. When the state of mind sufficient to establish
an element of an offense is not prescribed by law, that element is
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distributive rule and the pervasive culpability requirement.
Illinois,33 North Dakota,34 and Arkansas35 have also adopted
established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly.
It is unnecessary to prove the defendant’s state of mind with regard to: (1)
Offenses which constitute violations, unless a particular state of mind is
included within the definition of the offenses; or (2) Offenses defined by
statutes other than this Criminal Code, insofar as a legislative purpose to
impose strict liability for such offenses or with respect to any material
element thereof plainly appears. 
See also id. § 252:
Prescribed state-of-mind requirement applies to all material elements.
When a statute defining an offense prescribes the state of mind that is
sufficient for the commission of the offense, without distinguishing among
the elements thereof, the provision shall apply to all the elements of the
offense, unless a contrary legislative purpose plainly appears.
33. See § 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-3 (West 1993):
(a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which involves
absolute liability, unless, with respect to each element described by the
statute defining the offense, he acts while having one of the mental states
described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7 [intent, knowledge, recklessness and
negligence].
(b) If the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular mental state
with respect to the offense as a whole, without distinguishing among the
elements thereof, the prescribed mental state applies to each such element.
If the statute does not prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an
element of an offense (other than an offense which involves absolute
liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4-4, 4-5 or 4-6 [intent,
knowledge or recklessness] is applicable;
See § 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-9:
Absolute liability . A person may be guilty of an offense without having, as
to each element thereof, one of the mental states described in Sections 4-4
through 4-7 if the offense is a misdemeanor which is not punishable by
incarceration or by a fine exceeding $500, or the statute defining the
offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability
for the conduct described.
34. N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-02-02.1 (1997) (“For the purposes of this title, a
person engages in conduct. . . .  (e) “Willfully” if he engages in the conduct
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly.”); see also id. § 12.1-02-02.2 (“If a
statute . . . defining a crime does not specify any culpability and does not provide
explicitly that a person may be guilty without culpability, the culpability that is
required is willfully.”); id. § 12.1-02-02.3:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly  provided, where culpability is required,
that kind of culpability is required with respect to every element of the
conduct and to those attendant circumstances specified in the definition of
the offense. . . . (b) Except as otherwise expressly provided, if conduct is an
offense if it causes a particular result, the required degree of culpability is
required with respect to the result. . . . (e) A factor as to which it is
expressly stated that it must “in fact” exist is a factor for which culpability
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the recklessness default, distributive, and pervasive
culpability rules, but have qualified the pervasive
culpability rule with a clear statement exception.  North
Dakota is unusual in providing a formula for such a clear
statement: If a statute provides that an element must “in
fact” exist or occur, no culpability is required with respect
to that element.36  Pennsylvania has also adopted the
homicide default rule.37
Tennessee38 has adopted the recklessness default rule
and the pervasive culpability default rule. Alaska achieves
the same effect by a slightly different scheme.  Alaska has
adopted a requirement of culpability absent a clear
statement of strict liability or legislative intent to hold
defendants strictly liable.  This default requirement of
culpability is not explicitly pervasive. Yet Alaska has also
adopted a default rule requiring knowledge with respect to
all conduct elements and recklessness with respect to all
circumstance and result elements. Thus, the pervasive
is not required.
35. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-203 (Michie 1997):
Culpable mental states—Interpretation of statutes (a) If a statute defining
an offense prescribes a culpable mental state and does not clearly indicate
that the culpable mental state applies to less than all the elements of the
offense, the prescribed culpable mental state applies to each element of the
offense. (b) Except as provided in § 5-2-204(2), if the statute defining an
offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, culpability is
nonetheless required and is established only if a person acts purposely,
knowingly, or recklessly.
36. See discussion of North Dakota Century Code, supra note 34.
37. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2501 (1999) (“(a) A person is guilty of criminal
homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death
of another human being. (b) Criminal homicide shall be classified as murder,
voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter.”).
38. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301 (1997):
(1) A person commits an offense who acts intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly or with criminal negligence, as the definition of the offense
requires, with respect to each element of the offense. . . .
A culpable mental state is required within this title unless the definition of
an offense plainly dispenses with a mental element.
If the definition of an offense within this title does not plainly dispense
with a mental element, intent, knowledge or recklessness suffices to
establish the culpable mental state.
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culpability rule is implied. 39
Some states have adopted the recklessness default rule
without the pervasive culpability rule. Texas40 and Utah41
have adopted the recklessness default rule and
nonpervasive culpability requirements with different
variants of clear statement exceptions. Both the Texas and
Utah culpability default rules could be read to apply to
39. See Alaska Stat. § 11.81.600 (Michie 1998):
General requirements of culpability . . . (b) A person is not guilty of an
offense unless the person acts with a culpable mental state, except that no
culpable mental state must be proved  (1) if the description of the offense
does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense is (A) a violation;
or (B) designated as one of “strict liability”; or (2) if a legislative intent to
dispense with the culpable mental state requirement is present.
See also id. § 11.81.610 (b) (“Except as provided in § 11.81.600(b) if a provision of
law defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, the culpable
mental state that must be proved with respect to (1) conduct is ‘knowingly’; and
(2) a circumstance or a result is ‘recklessly.’”).
40. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.02 (West 1977):
Requirement of Culpability. Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person
does not commit an offense unless he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly,
or with criminal negligence engages in conduct as the definition of the
offense requires.
If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a
culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly
dispenses with any mental element.
If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state,
but one is nevertheless required under Subsection (b), intent, knowledge, or
recklessness suffices to establish criminal responsibility.
41. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101 (1999):
Requirements of criminal conduct and criminal responsibility.  No person is
guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited by law and:
He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or
with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense,
as the definition of the offense requires; or
His acts constitute an offense involving strict liability. . . .
See also id. § 76-2-102:
Culpable mental state required—Strict liability.
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental
state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable
mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent,
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility.
An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility . . .
without requiring proof of any culpable mental state.
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conduct elements only but need not be so read.  Texas
requires culpable “conduct” and Utah requires culpable
“action.”  Yet both Codes define these terms so as to include
acting with culpability with respect to the nature of the
conduct, or its result, or attendant circumstances.42 Texas
has also adopted the homicide default rule,43 while Utah
has adopted a modified version that defines homicide as
causing death “[i]ntentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with
criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state
otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense.”44
Ohio has adopted the recklessness default rule and an
apparently nonpervasive culpability requirement with a
clear statement exception.45
A total of seven states—Maine, New Hampshire, New
York, Alabama, Kentucky, Oregon and Montana—have
what amounts to a negligence default rule.  Maine46 and
42. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03 (West 1977) (giving definitions of culpable
mental states); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1999) (giving definitions).
43. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.01 (West 1977) (“(a) A person commits
criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal
negligence causes the death of an individual. (b) Criminal homicide is murder,
capital murder, manslaughter, or criminally negligent homicide.”).
44. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201(1999).
45. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.21 (West 1999):
Requirements for criminal liability. [On or After 7-1-96] (A) Except as
provided in division (B) of this section, a person is not guilty of an offense
unless . . . (2) He has the requisite degree of culpability for each element as
to which a culpable mental state is specified by the section defining the
offense.
(B) When the section defining an offense does not specify any degree of
culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal
liability for the conduct described in such section, then culpability is not
required for a person to be guilty of the offense. When the section neither
specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict
liability, recklessness is sufficient culpability to commit the offense.
46. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 17-a, § 34 (West 1983):
Culpable state of mind as an element. 1. A person is not guilty of a crime
unless that person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently,
as the law defining the crime specifies, with respect to each other element
of the crime, except as provided in subsection 4. . . .
2. When the definition of a crime specifies the state of mind sufficient for
the commission of that crime, but without distinguishing among the
elements thereof, the specified state of mind applies  to all the other
elements of the crime, except as provided in subsection. . . .
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New Hampshire47 have adopted the pervasive culpability
rule and the distributive rule. New York has adopted a
pervasive culpability default rule, the distributive rule and
also the necessarily involved culpability rule.48
3. Unless otherwise expressly provided, a culpable mental state need not be
proved with respect to:
A.
 
  Any fact that is solely a basis for sentencing classification;
B.
 




 Any element of the crime as to which the statute expressly provides




 Any element of the crime as to which a legislative intent to impose




 Any criminal statute as to which it is expressly stated to be a “strict
liability crime” or otherwise expressly reflects a legislative intent to
impose criminal liability without proof by the state of a culpable
mental state with respect to any of the elements of the crime; or
F.
 
 Any criminal statute as to which a legislative intent to impose liability
without a culpable state of mind as to any of the elements of the crime
otherwise appears.
4-A. As  used in this section, “strict liability crime” means a crime that, as
legally defined, does not include a culpable mental state element with
respect to any of the elements of the crime and thus proof by the state of a
culpable state of mind as to that crime is not required.
47. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 62 626:2 (1996):
I. A person is guilty of murder, a felony, or a misdemeanor only if he acts
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require,
with respect to each material element of the offense. . . . When the law
defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for
its commission, without distinguishing among the material elements
thereof, such culpability shall apply to all the material elements, unless a
contrary purpose plainly appears.
48. See N.Y. Penal Law § 15.10 (McKinney 1998):
Requirements for criminal liability in general and for offenses of strict
liability and mental culpability.
If . . . conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense,
or if an offense, or some material element thereof does not require a
culpable mental state on the part of the actor, such offense is one of “strict
liability.”  If a culpable mental state on the part of the actor is required
with respect to every material element of an offense, such offense is one of
mental culpability.
Id. § 15.15 Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements:
When the commission of an offense defined in this chapter, or some
element of an offense, requires a particular culpable mental state, such
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Alabama has similarly adopted the distributive and
necessarily involved culpability rules and has adopted a
culpability default rule that may or may not be pervasive.
A pervasive culpability rule may be implied in Alabama by
a presumption against strict liability offenses, combined
with a definition of strict liability offenses as those lacking
a culpable mental state with respect to any element. On the
other hand, Alabama has paradoxically also defined
offenses involving culpability with respect to even one
element as offenses of mental culpability.49  Alabama has
mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute. . . .  When one and only
one such term appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to
apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its
application clearly appears.
Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute
defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required
for the commission of such offense, or with respect to some or all material
elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such
culpable mental state.  A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating
a legislative intent to impose strict liability, should be construed as
defining a crime of mental culpability. . . .
49. See Ala. Code § 13A-2-3 (1994):
Minimum requirement for criminal liability—Strict liability—Mental
culpability.  The minimum requirement for criminal liability is the
performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the
omission to perform an act which he is physically capable of performing. If
that conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense, or
if an offense or some material element thereof does not require a culpable
mental state on the part of the actor, the offense is one of “strict liability.”
If a culpable mental state on the part of the actor is required with respect
to any material element of an offense, the offense is one of “mental
culpability.”
See also id. § 13A-2-4:
Mental state. (a) When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an
element thereof a specified culpable mental state, such mental state is
presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless the context
thereof indicates to the contrary.
(b) Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute
defining an offense, an appropriate culpable mental state may nevertheless
be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or
all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily
involves such culpable mental state. A statute defining a crime, unless
clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, states a
crime of mental culpability.
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also adopted the homicide default rule.50
Kentucky has adopted what appears to be a pervasive
culpability requirement for felonies in the Criminal Code,
and the necessarily involved culpability rule.51
Nevertheless, there is room for interpreting the culpability
requirement as nonpervasive.  Section 501.030(2) of the
Kentucky code requires that defendant act “intentionally,
knowingly, wantonly or recklessly as the law may require,
with respect to each element of the offense.”52  Section
501.050, which excludes “absolute liability” for felonies,
defines “absolute liability” as liability when the defendant
does not act with one of those culpable mental states.53
These definitions permit the interpretation that the law
50. See id. § 13A-6-1 (“The following terms have the meanings ascribed them
by this section: (1) Homicide A person commits criminal homicide if he
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence causes the death
of another person. . . . (3) Criminal homicide Murder, manslaughter, or criminally
negligent homicide.”).
51. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 501.030 (Michie 1999):
Criminal liability. A person is not guilty of a criminal offense unless:
(2) He has engaged in such conduct intentionally, knowingly, wantonly or
recklessly as the law may require, with respect to each element of the
offense, except that this requirement does not apply to any offense which
imposes absolute liability, as defined in KRS 501.050.
Id. § 501.040. Culpability—Construction of statutes
Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute
defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required
for the commission of such offense, or with respect to some or all of the
material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves
such culpable mental state.
See also id. § 501.050:
Absolute liability.
A person may be guilty of an offense without having one of the culpable
mental states defined in § 501.020 only when:
(1)
 
The offense is violation or a misdemeanor as defined in § 500.080 and
no particular culpable mental state is included within the definition
of the offense; or
(2)
 
The offense is defined by a statute other than this Penal Code and the
statute clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute
liability for the conduct described.
52. See also supra note 40 (quoting similar provision in section 6.02 of the
Texas Penal Code).
53. See also id.
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need not require a culpable mental state for each offense
element.  Yet the Model Penal Code section 2.02(1) uses the
same “as the law may require” phrase as KRS 501.030(2)
and clearly means by it “whichever particular culpable
mental state the law requires” rather than meaning
“whichever culpable mental state the law requires if the
law requires any.”
Oregon has adopted the pervasive culpability default
rule and the distributive rule.54
Montana has adopted the distributive rule and a
pervasive culpability default rule, excepting explicitly
designated strict liability offenses and, crucially, felony
murder.55  For felony murder, purpose or knowledge are
54. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.095 (1999) (“Requirements of culpability. . . . (2)
Except as provided in ORS 161.105, a person is not guilty of an offense unless the
person acts with a culpable mental state with respect to each material element of
the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state.”).
See also id. § 161.105.
Culpability requirements inapplicable to certain violations and offenses.
(1)  Notwithstanding ORS 161.095, a culpable mental state is not required
if:
(a) The offense constitutes a violation, unless a culpable mental state is
expressly included in the definition of the offense; or
(b) An offense defined by a statute outside the Oregon Criminal Code
clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental
state requirement for the offense or for any material element thereof.
(2) Notwithstanding any other existing law, and unless a statute enacted
after January 1, 1972, otherwise provides, an offense defined by a statute
outside the Oregon Criminal Code that requires no culpable mental state
constitutes a violation.
Id. § 161.115:
Construction of statutes with respect to culpability.
(1) If a statute defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state but
does not specify the element to which it applies, the prescribed culpable
mental state applies to each material element of the offense that
necessarily requires a culpable mental state.
(2) Except as provided in § 161.105, if a statute defining an offense does not
prescribe a culpable mental state, culpability is nonetheless required and is
established only if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or
with criminal negligence.
55. See Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-103 (1999):
General requirements of criminal act and mental state.
(1) Except for deliberate homicide as defined in 45-5-102(1)(b) [felony
murder] or an offense that involves absolute liability, a person is not guilty
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required for the predicate felony only.
One state, Arizona, has adopted a strict liability
default rule, combined with the distributive rule and the
necessarily involved culpability rule.56
Three states, Colorado57, Connecticut,58 and Indiana59
of an offense unless, with respect to each element described by the statute
defining the offense, a person acts while having one of the mental states of
knowingly, negligently, or purposely.
(2) In deliberate homicide under 45-5-102(1)(b), the offender must act while
having the mental state of purposely or knowingly only as to the
underlying felony referred to in 45-5-102(1)(b). . . .  (4) If the statute
defining an offense prescribes a particular mental state with respect to the
offense as a whole without distinguishing among the elements of the
offense, the prescribed mental state applies to each element.
56. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-202 (1989):
Construction of statutes with respect to culpability.
A. If a statute defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state that is
sufficient for commission of the offense without distinguishing among the
elements of such offense, the prescribed mental state shall apply to each
such element unless a contrary legislative purpose plainly appears.
B. If a statute defining an offense does not expressly prescribe a culpable
mental state that is sufficient for commission of the offense, no culpable
mental state is required for the commission of such offense, and the offense
is one of strict liability unless the proscribed conduct necessarily involves a
culpable mental state. . . .
57. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-502 (West 1999):
The minimum requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a
person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform
an act which he is physically capable of performing. If that conduct is all
that is required for commission of a particular offense, or if an offense or
some material element thereof does not require a culpable mental state on
the part of the actor, the offense is one of “strict liability.”  If a culpable
mental state on the part of the actor is required with respect to any
material element of an offense, the offense is one of “mental culpability.”
See also id. § 18-1-503:
(1) When the commission of an offense, or some element of an offense,
requires a particular culpable mental state, that mental state is ordinarily
designated by use of the terms “intentionally,” “with intent,” “knowingly,”
“willfully,” “recklessly,” or “criminal negligence”. . . .
(2) Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute
defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required
for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or all of the
material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves
such a culpable mental state. . . .
(4) When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a
specified culpable mental state, that mental state is deemed to apply to
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have adopted the distributive rule only, although Colorado
also has adopted the “necessarily involved culpability rule.”
In addition, Colorado has adopted the same contradictory
definitions of strict liability and culpability found in
Alabama, although without a pervasive or nonpervasive
culpability rule.
Of  these twenty-five states, four need concern us no
further. Connecticut and Indiana have adopted only the
distributive rule, which by itself provides little support for
reading a culpable mental state into a felony murder
statute.  Montana and Arizona have provided in their
default rules that no culpable mental state is required with
respect to the causation of death for the crime of felony
murder.
Nevertheless, Montana is the proverbial exception that
proves the rule.  By explicitly excepting felony murder from
its scheme of culpability rules, Montana’s legislature
acknowledged the inconsistency between these rules and
the doctrine that felons are strictly liable for the causation
of death.  Clearly the Montana legislature thought that
without this unique exception clause, the Model Penal
Code’s default culpability scheme would abolish or
substantially alter the felony murder doctrine.  If the
twenty-one other legislatures that substantially adopted
the Model Penal Code’s default rules shared this view, we
every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly
appears.
58. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-5 (West 1994):
When the commission of an offense defined in this title, or some element of
an offense, requires a particular mental state, such mental state is
ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense by use of the terms
“intentionally,” “knowingly,” “recklessly,” or “criminal negligence,” or by
use of terms, such as “with intent to defraud” and “knowing it to be false,”
describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge. When one and only one of
such terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply
to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application
clearly appears.
59. See Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-2-2 § 2(d) (Michie 1998) (“Unless the statute
defining the offense provides otherwise, if a kind of culpability is required for
commission of an offense, it is required with respect to every material element of
the prohibited conduct.”).
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would expect to find felony murder provisions conditioning
the offense on culpability.  And if courts in those states
shared this view, we would expect to find decisions reading
culpability requirements into definitions of felony murder.
Let us now turn to the murder statutes in the twenty-
one states that concern us.  We will first consider default
rule states which have avoided ambiguity by specifying the
mental element of felony murder in their definitions of that
offense. Next we will consider the interpretive problem
posed in default rule states by felony murder statutes that
do not specify the mental element.  Finally we will examine
the felony murder statutes that fall into this category and
see how they have been construed in the courts.
IV. CULPABILITY TERMS IN FELONY MURDER STATUTES
Seven of our twenty-one remaining default rule
states—Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine,
New Hampshire, and Tennessee—have specified the
mental  element of killing in the course of a felony.
Four of these states—Hawaii, Kentucky, Arkansas and
New Hampshire—have roughly followed the Model Penal
Code approach of defining felony murder out of existence.
Hawaii, a recklessness default rule state, has no felony
murder provision and makes intent to kill an element of all
murder.60  Kentucky, a negligence default rule state also
60. See Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 707-701 (Michie 1993):
Murder in the first degree.
(1) A person commits the offense of murder in the first degree if the person
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of:
(a) More than one person in the same or separate incident;
(b) A peace officer, judge, or prosecutor arising out of the performance of
official duties;
(c) A person known by the defendant to be a witness in a criminal
prosecution;
(d) A person by a hired killer, in which event both the person hired and the
person responsible for hiring the killer shall be punished under this
section; or
(e) A person while the defendant was imprisoned. . . .
See also id. § 707-701.5. (“Murder in the second degree.  (1) Except as provided in
section 707-701, a person commits the offense of murder in the second degree if
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has no felony murder provision and conditions murder on
intent to kill or extreme indifference to human life.61
Arkansas, a recklessness default rule state, has a felony
murder provision, but conditions the offense on extreme
indifference to human life.62  New Hampshire, a negligence
the person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another person.”).
61. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507.020 (Michie 1999):
Murder.
(1) A person is guilty of murder when:
(a) With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of
such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution a person
shall not be guilty under this subsection if he acted under the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable
explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the
circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. However, nothing
contained in this section shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for or
preclude a conviction of manslaughter in the first degree or any other
crime;
(b) Including, but not limited to, the operation of a motor vehicle under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he wantonly
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person
and thereby causes the death of another person.
62. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-102 (Michie 1998):
Murder in the first degree.
(a) A person commits murder in the first degree if:
(1) Acting alone or with one (1) or more other persons, he commits or
attempts to commit a felony, and in the course of and in the furtherance of
the felony or in immediate flight therefrom, he or an accomplice causes the
death of any person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life; or (2) With a purpose of causing the death of
another person, he causes the death of another person; or
(3) He knowingly causes the death of a person fourteen (14) years of age or
younger at the time the murder was committed.
(b) It is an affirmative defense to any prosecution under subdivision (a) (1)
of this section for an offense in which the defendant was not the only
participant that the defendant:
(1)
 
Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, command,
induce, procure, counsel, or aid its commission; and
 
(2) Was not armed with a deadly weapon; and
 (3)Reasonably believed that no other participant was armed with a
deadly
        weapon; and
 (4) Reasonably believed that no other participant intended to engage in
conduct which could result in death or serious physical injury. . . .
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default rule state, has a felony murder provision which
closely tracks that of the Model Penal Code. The New
Hampshire code conditions first degree murder on killing
purposely and with premeditation or knowingly in the
attempt or commission of sexual assault, robbery, burglary,
arson or assassination.63  It conditions second degree
murder on recklessness and extreme indifference to the
value of human life but provides that these mental states
may be presumed from causing death by the use of a deadly
weapon in committing any “class A felony.”64  The Code
See also id. § 5-10-103:
Murder in the second degree.
(a)
 
A person commits murder in the second degree if:
(1) He knowingly causes the death of another person under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; or
(2) With the purpose of  injury to another person, he causes the death of
any  person. . . .
63. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:1-a (1996):
First Degree Murder.—I. A person is guilty of murder in the first degree if
he:
(a) Purposely causes the death of another; or
(b) Knowingly causes the death of:
(1) Another before, after, while engaged in the commission of, or while
attempting to commit felonious sexual assault as defined in § 632-A:3;
(2) Another before, after, while engaged in the commission of, or while
attempting to commit robbery or burglary while armed with a deadly
weapon, the death being caused by the use of such weapon;
(3) Another in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate arson as defined in
§ 634:1, I, II, or III;
(4) The president or president-elect or vice-president or vice-president-elect
of the United States, the governor or governor-elect of New Hampshire or
any state or any member or member-elect of the congress of the United
States, or any candidate for such office after such candidate has been
nominated at his party’s primary, when such killing is motivated by
knowledge of the foregoing capacity of the victim.
64. See id. § 630:1-b:
Second Degree Murder.– I. A person is guilty of murder in the second
degree if:
(a) He knowingly causes the death of another; or
(b) He causes such death recklessly under circumstances manifesting an
extreme indifference to the value of human life. Such recklessness and
indifference are presumed if the actor causes the death by the use of a
deadly weapon in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit, or in
immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit any class A
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further provides that “presumptions” like that contained in
the felony murder definition are permissive rather than
mandatory.65  In other words, the jury may consider
causing death through the use of a deadly weapon in the
commission of a felony to prove recklessness and extreme
indifference to human life, but it need not, and it still must
be convinced of the presence of these mental states beyond
a reasonable doubt.  The practical consequence of this
statute has been the abolition of felony murder in New
Hampshire.  Prosecutions for second degree murder do not
appear to avail themselves of the statutory presumption,
perhaps because an attack with a deadly weapon supplies
prima facie evidence of recklessness and extreme
indifference whether or not in perpetration of a felony.
Tennessee, a recklessness default state, requires
culpability with respect to each element of an offense,
absent a clear statutory  statement that an offense is strict
liability with respect to some element.  Between 1989 and
1995, the Tennessee Code conditioned both first and second
degree felony murder liability on recklessly causing death.66
felony.
65. See id. § 626:7 II:
When this code establishes a presumption with respect to any fact which is
an element of an offense, it has the following consequences: (a) When there
is evidence of the facts which give rise to the presumption, the issue of the
existence of the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury, unless the
court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly negatives the
presumed fact; and (b) When the issue of the existence of the presumed fact
is submitted to the jury, the court shall charge that while the presumed
fact must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the
law declares that the jury may regard the facts giving rise to the
presumption as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact.
66. 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 591, at 1197, § 39-13-202:
(a) First degree murder is (1) An intentional, premeditated, and deliberate
killing of another; or (2) A reckless killing of another committed in the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any murder in the first degree, arson,
rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or the unlawful
throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
See id., at 1202 § 39-13-206:
(a) Second degree murder is (1) A knowing killing of another; or (2) a
reckless killing of another which results form the unlawful distribution of
opium, or any synthetic or natural salt, compound, derivative or
preparation of opium . . . when such drug is proven to be the proximate
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In 1995, however, Tennessee eliminated these provisions.
The Tennessee Code now specifies that no culpable mental
state is required for first degree felony murder liability
other than that required for the commission of the
enumerated predicate felonies (the traditional enumerated
dangerous felonies plus murder, theft, kidnapping,
prolonged child abuse,  air piracy, and bombing).67  When
combined with Tennessee’s clear statement exception to its
culpability requirement, this new first degree felony
murder definition achieves the same result as Montana’s
felony murder exception to its otherwise pervasive
culpability requirement. Tennessee’s new second degree
murder provision includes the distribution of drugs which
proximately cause the death of their user.68  This proximate
cause standard may implicitly condition liability on
negligence, or the default mental state of recklessness may
be required.
Two default rule states, Delaware and Maine, have
felony murder definitions requiring negligence.  Delaware,
a recklessness default state, explicitly conditions second
degree felony murder on negligently causing death in the
course of any felony.69  If death is caused negligently in the
cause of the death of the user.
67. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202 (1997):
First degree murder.
(a) First degree murder is:
(1) A premeditated and intentional killing of another;
(2) A killing of another committed in the perpetration of or attempt to
perpetrate any first degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft,
kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect or aircraft
piracy; or
(3) A killing of another committed as the result of the unlawful throwing,
placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
(b) No culpable mental state is required for conviction under subdivision
(a)(2) or (a)(3) except the intent to commit the enumerated offenses or acts
in such subdivisions.
68. See id. § 39-13-210(a)(1)(2) (defining second degree murder as “(1) A
knowing killing of another; or (2) A killing of another which results from the
unlawful distribution of any Schedule I or Schedule II drug when such drug is the
proximate cause of the death of the user.”).
69. Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, § 635 (1998):
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course of an enumerated dangerous felony, or if death is
caused recklessly, the resulting liability rises to murder in
the first degree.70
The Delaware felony murder provisions contain one
offense with an uncertain mens rea, however.  Section 636
(7) provides for first degree murder liability when the
offender “causes the death of another person in order to
avoid or prevent the lawful arrest of any person, or in the
course of and in furtherance of the commission or
attempted commission of escape in the second degree or
escape after conviction.”71  Because no mental element is
specified, the default rule would seem to require a mental
element of recklessness, but no Delaware case has as yet
construed section 636(7).  Conceivably, a court could
decline to apply the recklessness default rule to section
636(7), on the ground that it already requires the mental
Murder in the second degree; class B felony.
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
(1) The person recklessly causes the death of another person under
circumstances which manifest a cruel, wicked and depraved indifference to
human life; or
(2) In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted
commission of any felony not specifically enumerated in § 636 of this title
or immediate flight therefrom, the person, with criminal negligence, causes
the death of another person.
70. See id. § 636:
Murder in the first degree; class A felony.
(a) A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when . . . .
(2) In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted
commission of a felony or immediate flight therefrom, the person recklessly
causes the death of another person; . . .
 (5) The person causes the death of another person by the use of or
detonation of any bomb or similar destructive device;
(6) The person, with criminal negligence, causes the death of another
person in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted
commission of any degree of rape, unlawful sexual intercourse in the first
or second degree, kidnapping, arson in the first degree, robbery in the first
degree, burglary in the first degree, or immediate flight therefrom;
(7) The person causes the death of another person in order to avoid or
prevent the lawful arrest of any person, or in the course of and in
furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of escape in the
second degree or escape after conviction.
71. Id.
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states of purpose to prevent an arrest or further an escape.
Yet these mental states apply only to the attendant
circumstance of the attempted escape or avoidance of
custody.  They do not apply to the result element of death.
According to Delaware Code section 251(b), an element is
not established unless a corresponding mental state—
either specified in the definition of the offense, or supplied
by the recklessness default rule—is established.  And
section 232 defines elements as including “those physical
acts, attendant circumstances, [and] results” specified in
the statute defining the offense.72  Hence, the result
element of death cannot be established without a
corresponding mental state.  In addition to these felony
murder offenses, Delaware has two additional offenses
similar to felony murder: first and second degree “murder
by abuse.”  These offenses respectively require the reckless
or negligent killing of a child in the course of a pattern of
repeated abuse.73
In Maine, a state with a negligence default rule, the
negligence standard is less explicit but seems clearly
implied by a statutory causation standard of
foreseeability.74  A distinct offense, rather than a variant of
murder, “felony murder” is a class A crime, the equivalent
of manslaughter.  Felony murder requires that death be “a
72. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 232 (1998).
73. See id. §§ 633, 634.
74. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-a, § 202 (West 1983):
Felony murder  1. A person is guilty of felony murder if acting alone or
with one or more other persons in the commission of, or an attempt to
commit, or immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit,
murder, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, gross sexual assault, or
escape, the person or another participant in fact causes the death of a
human being, and the death is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
such commission, attempt or flight.  2. It is an affirmative defense to
prosecution under this section that the defendant: A. Did not commit the
homicidal act or in any way solicit, command, induce, procure or aid the
commission thereof; B. Was not armed with a dangerous weapon, or other
weapon which under circumstances indicated a readiness to inflict serious
bodily injury; C. Reasonably believed that no other participant was armed
with such a weapon; and D. Reasonably believed that no other participant
intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious bodily
injury.
BINDERMACRO 1/10/01  2:23 PM
2000] MENS REA DEFAULT RULES 437
reasonably foreseeable consequence” of the commission,
attempt, or flight after murder, robbery, burglary,
kidnapping arson, rape, or escape.  This “reasonably
foreseeable” standard dovetails with Maine’s definition of
criminal negligence with respect to a result as the failure
“to be aware of a risk that his conduct will cause such a
result” constituting a “gross deviation for the standard of
conduct which a reasonable and prudent person would
observe.”75 Maine also offers an affirmative defense to
accomplices who neither caused death nor had reason to
know that a weapon would be used.
In sum, seven of the states with default culpability
standards that could potentially apply to felony murder
provisions in fact specify the mental elements of felony
murder.  One of these states, Delaware, provides one
particular felony murder offense, predicated on escape,
without a clearly specified mental element.
V. THE INTERPRETIVE PROBLEM: STRATEGIES OF EVASION
We are left with fifteen states (including Delaware)
with definitions of felony murder silent as to culpability but
that nevertheless have mens rea default rules that seem to
require culpability.  These states are  Alabama, Alaska,
Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and Utah, as well as Delaware. Let us turn now to the
interpretive problem posed in these states.  How may
courts deal with the default rules in applying traditional
felony murder provisions?
The most straightforward response is simply to apply
the default culpability standard.  But there are three sorts
75. See id. § 35.4 (“In adopting this reasonable foreseeability standard,  the
statute codified preexisting case law requiring that death foreseeably  result from
the manner of committing the felony.”); see also State v. Reardon, 486 A.2d 112
(Me. 1984); State v. Collins 297 A.2d 620 (Me. 1972) (breaking and entering of
dwelling acceptable as predicate felony because of danger of occupants being
present and violence resulting); State v. Wallace 333 A.2d 72 (Me. 1975) (stating
that sodomy is acceptable as predicate felony where committed forcibly on a small
child, because of danger).
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of strategies for evading the default rules in reading felony
murder provisions that are silent as to mens rea:
(A) Reading the default rules as nonpervasive;
(B) Reading the felony murder provision as explicitly
imposing strict liability, and
(C) Reading the felony murder provision as in fact supplying
a culpable mental state.
A.  The Nonpervasive Default Rule Strategy
The simplest general strategy for avoiding application
of the default mental state to felony murder is to deny that
the default rules actually require a culpable mental state
for every element.  On this view, the default rule may be
satisfied as long as the defendant has the requisite
culpable mental state with respect to an attendant
circumstance like “in the commission or attempt of a
felony.”  This is a plausible position if the code lacks the
pervasive culpability rule, although by no means a
necessary one.  And it is a confused or dishonest position in
a state with the pervasive culpability rule.
B.  The Explicit Strict Liability Strategy
A second general strategy of evasion that is more
appealing in pervasive culpability states with a clear
statement exception is to read the statute as “clearly
indicating a legislative purpose to impose strict liability.”
Mind you, we have identified the only two statutory
provisions in default rule states—Tennessee’s definition of
first degree murder and Montana’s default rule—
unequivocally stating that a felony murder offense requires
no culpability with respect to the causation of death.  So at
this point in the analysis, we are talking only about the
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interpretation of statutory provisions which do not clearly
indicate an intention to impose strict liability.  How can
courts read such a “clear” intent into them?  There are four
methods available: the historical, the doctrinal, the
structural, and the instrumental.76
1.  Legislative History
One way is to turn outside the statute to legislative
historical evidence of legislative intent.  A particularly
convincing source of such evidence is the report or
commentary of a code drafting commission, although it
remains possible to argue that if an intention to impose
strict liability has to be demonstrated on this basis it is not
clearly indicated by the statute itself.
2.  Doctrine
A second way to find such a “clearly indicated”
legislative intent is to read a modern felony murder
provision against the background of  the common law or
prior legislation.  Thus, without attending to the language
or structure of  the statute one may simply identify a
provision punishing the causation of death during a felony
as a recognizable “felony murder” provision, assert that the
felony murder doctrine has traditionally held felons strictly
liable for deaths caused, and advert to well-worn policy
rationales for such a rule, lifted from judicial opinions and
treatises.  Needless to say, this doctrinalist approach to
interpretation is at odds with the “clearly indicated
legislative intent” standard.  And this reliance on the
traditional jurisprudence of felony murder that the drafters
76. These four forms of argument are distinguished and explained in Philip
Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (1982); Philip Bobbitt,
Constitutional Interpretation (1991).  For similar accounts, see also Dennis
Patterson, Law and Truth (1996); Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and
Criminal Procedure: First Principles (1997); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights:
Creation and Reconstruction (1998); William Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation (1994).
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of the Model Penal Code so bitterly critiqued  is a perverse
way to read a felony murder provision embedded in a
statute inspired by the Model Penal Code.  If we must
glean the meaning of a code provision from context, why is
pre-code case law  a more authoritative context than the
official commentary on a model code?
3.  Statutory Structure
A third way to find such a “clearly indicated”
legislative intent is to my mind more legitimate than these
first two, but unheard of in the case law.  This is to rely on
structural interpretation in arguing that conditioning
felony murder on the negligent or reckless causation of
death would be inconsistent with other features of the law
defining felony murder or murder more generally.
For example, suppose that the default mental state in
a given jurisdiction is a quite demanding one, like purpose
or knowledge or intent.  Suppose further that the statute
defines killing with this mental state as murder and treats
killing in the course of a dangerous felony as an aggravator
raising first degree murder to a potentially capital offense.
It would be inconsistent to read the default mental state of
purpose or knowledge or intent into a provision defining
causing death in the course of these same predicate felonies
as murder.  It might seem sensible to read a mental
element of  recklessness or negligence into the offense, but
a court could conclude that the default rules make
available only the antinomic alternatives of the default
mental state, or strict liability.  Of course a differently
disposed court could find a culpable mental state of
negligence implied by the element of causation,
particularly if it has available the “necessarily involved”
culpability rule.
Consider a  second example of structural argument for
a “clearly indicated” legislative intent to impose strict
liability.  Several states have adopted an affirmative
defense which excuses from felony murder liability those
accomplices in predicate felonies who can prove that they
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neither struck the fatal blow nor had reason to know that
any participant would use deadly force or carry a gun.  This
defense amounts to an affirmative defense for those
accomplices who can demonstrate that they could not have
foreseen the resulting and death and so were non-
negligent.  Such a defense would be redundant if the
prosecution were required to prove recklessness or even
negligence as part of its prima facie case.  Hence, one might
argue, the creation of such a defense indicates a legislative
intent to impose strict liability rather than a default
culpable mental state.  The persuasiveness of this
argument of course depends on the particular jurisdiction’s
culpability standards for complicity in general and for
felony murder in particular.
4.  Instrumental or Policy Considerations
A fourth strategy for ascribing a manifest legislative
purpose to impose strict liability is to engage in explicit
policy argument.  For example, a court might assert that
the purpose of a felony murder provision must be to deter
killings in the course of felonies and that this purpose is
best served by a strict liability rule, even though neither of
these conclusions is at all obvious.  More plausibly,  a court
might reason that the restriction of felony murder liability
to killings in furtherance of inherently dangerous felonies
sufficiently insures the culpability of persons convicted of
felony murder, so that separate proof of culpability is
unnecessary.
C.  The Implicit Culpability Strategy
A third general strategy of evasion is to read the felony
murder provision as specifying or implying a culpable
mental state.  This strategy can take at least four forms.
1.  “Criminal Homicide”
One possible strategy is provided by the Model Penal
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Code itself, in providing a general definition of criminal
homicide as causing death with purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, or negligence and denominating murder as a
form of criminal homicide.  In jurisdictions with such a
provision, it is possible to argue that felony murder is just a
particular form and grade of “criminal homicide,” and that
the mental element of felony murder is therefore supplied
by this general definition.  Since the “stacking rule”
dictates that purpose includes knowledge, knowledge
includes recklessness, and recklessness includes
negligence, criminal homicide simply means negligent
homicide.  The offense of criminal homicide can be raised to
manslaughter or murder by aggravating mental states (like
purpose to kill) or aggravating circumstances (like causing
death in the course of a felony).
2.  Transferred Intent
One form of this strategy involves resurrecting an idea
the drafters of the Model Penal Code worked hard to lay to
rest, the idea of transferred intent.  According to this
argument, the felony murder rule involves ascribing the
culpable mental state attending the predicate felony to the
resulting death.  Yet the intent to enter a dwelling at night
and there commit the felony of permanently depriving an
owner of her property is not an intent to cause death, even
if it plausibly implies some other culpable mental state
with respect to the risk of death, like recklessness or
negligence.  The transferred intent argument misses the
whole point of Model Penal Code element analysis, which is
to assign each act, circumstance, and result its own
culpable mental state.  Nevertheless, there are better ways




One of these methods  is available  if the statutory
definition predicates felony murder only on enumerated
dangerous felonies, or on any felony dangerous to life, or on
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any “forcible felony” or on an act dangerous to life
committed in furtherance of a felony.  Here a court can
argue that negligence at least, and perhaps even
recklessness, is necessarily entailed in the commission of
the predicate crime. Another method is available if the
statutory definition conditions felony murder on
proximately or foreseeably causing death.  These terms can
be taken as euphemisms for negligence.  I should
emphasize that these methods of reading negligence
standards into felony murder definitions only function as
evasions of default culpability in states with recklessness
or knowledge or purpose default rules.  In states with
negligence default rules, they are ways of carrying out the
mandate of the default rules, albeit somewhat circuitous
ways.
4.  Proximate Cause
Finally, what if courts read inherent dangerousness
limitations and foreseeability standards into felony murder
definitions that are silent on these subjects?  These
interpretations of an open-ended felony murder definition
are compatible with a negligence default rule, but may not
always be motivated or informed by such a rule.  Indeed
most courts seem blissfully oblivious of the applicability of
default rules to felony murder definitions.
VI.  THE INTERPRETIVE PROBLEM IN THE COURTS
Let us now examine the treatment of the interpretive
problem by state courts.  As the above discussion indicates,
the interpretive problem facing courts is somewhat
different depending on whether the default culpability rule
is pervasive or nonpervasive and also depending on
whether it requires recklessness or knowledge on the one
hand, or mere negligence on the other.  For our purposes, a
homicide default rule functions like a pervasive negligence
rule to require negligence with respect to causation of
death for felony murder.  Accordingly, we will consider the
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judicial interpretation of felony murder provisions that are
silent with respect to mens rea, in states with three sorts of
default rules: pervasive recklessness or intent default
rules, pervasive negligence default rules, and nonpervasive
default rules.
A.  Pervasive Recklessness (or Intent) States
We will begin with the states that have pervasive
default rules requiring a culpable mental state of at least
recklessness.  Of these, we have already discussed
Delaware and its special escape-murder offense.  The
remaining pervasive recklessness states with felony
murder provisions silent as to mens rea are North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Missouri, Illinois, New Jersey, and Alaska.
North Dakota conditions first degree murder liability
on causing death in the course and in furtherance of
enumerated dangerous felonies, while providing an
affirmative defense for accomplices in felonies who could
not have foreseen that another participant would kill.77  No
North Dakota appellate decision has as yet construed the
77. See. N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-16-01(1997):
Murder.
1. A person is guilty of murder, a class AA felony, if the person . . .
 c. Acting either alone or with one or more other persons, commits or
attempts to commit treason, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, felonious
restraint, arson, gross sexual imposition, a felony offense against a child
under section 12.1-20-03, 12.1-27.2-02, 12.1-27.2-03, 12.1-27.2-04, or 14-09-
22, or escape and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of
immediate flight therefrom, the person or any other participant in the
crime causes the death of any person. In any prosecution under this
subsection in which the defendant was not the only participant in the
underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:
(1) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, command,
induce, procure, counsel, or aid the commission thereof;
(2) Was not armed with a firearm, destructive device, dangerous weapon,
or other weapon which under the circumstances indicated a readiness to
inflict serious bodily injury;
(3) Reasonably believed that no other participant was armed with such a
weapon; and
(4) Reasonably believed that no other participant intended to engage in
conduct likely to result in death or serious bodily injury.
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felony murder provisions with respect to mens rea. North
Dakota’s recklessness default rule requires recklessness
unless strict liability is “expressly” imposed and specifically
requires culpability with respect to result elements unless
otherwise “expressly provided.”  The same article provides
that an offense definition may “expressly” impose strict
liability with respect to an element by stating that such
element must “in fact” exist or occur.  Since no such
language appears in North Dakota’s felony murder
provision, recklessness appears to be the mental element of
felony murder. However, North Dakota’s affirmative
defense makes possible a structural argument that North
Dakota’s felony murder provision “expressly” imposes strict
liability.  After all, it makes little sense to allow the defense
to prove nonnegligence if the prosecution already bears the
burden to prove recklessness.  Nevertheless, the most
straightforward reading of the North Dakota statute would
condition felony murder on recklessness.
The North Dakota Code was based on the proposed
federal criminal code of 1971.78  The drafter’s official
comments on that code shed little further light on the
default rules.  However, the comment does characterize the
section providing that “in fact” means without culpability
as a “device for avoiding ambiguity as to whether
culpability is required as to certain factors.”79  The
comment on the felony murder definition does not mention
the default rules.  It says:
Under the traditional felony-murder doctrine, which serves
to upgrade certain killings that would normally be, at most,
manslaughter (as where defendant did not intend death or
knowingly risk grave harm), a purely accidental death
becomes murder if it occurs in the course of robbery or some
other violent felony.  Paragraph (c) would ameliorate the
harshness involved in applying the old rule to the person
who is not homicidal, but would place a heavy burden on the
78. See Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws: Proposed New Federal Criminal Code (1971).
79. Id. at 30.
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defendant to establish his lack of culpability in that
regard.80
The Drafting Commission seems to assume the new
law would apply the old rule of strict liability or negligence,
without considering the effect of the code’s recklessness
default rule.  Yet this appearance may be deceiving.  The
Drafting Commission initially proposed two alternative
versions of the felony murder rule: the Model Penal Code’s
version, which it initially endorsed, and New York’s felony
murder provision, which it ultimately adopted without
further explanation.81  While it is tempting to turn to the
New York statute in construing the North Dakota felony
murder provision, New York has different default rules,
requiring only negligence rather than recklessness.  The
proposed federal code provides a classic example of a
drafting commission rejecting the Model Penal Code’s
formulation of the felony murder rule in the special part,
while apparently adopting it through the mens rea default
rules of the Model Penal Code’s General Part.
For offenses defined within the criminal code itself,
Pennsylvania has a pervasive culpability requirement with
no exception for a clear statement or legislative purpose to
impose strict liability.  It has a recklessness default rule
and a homicide default rule. Second degree murder is
defined as criminal homicide committed in the perpetration
of a felony.  The perpetration of a felony is defined in turn
as the commission, attempt, or flight from the traditional
enumerated felonies of robbery, rape, forcible sodomy,
arson, burglary, or kidnapping.82 Surprisingly, the
80. Id. at 174.
81. See National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Study
Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code § 1601 cmt. at 164-65 (1970); II Working
Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws § 1601
cmt. 826 (Draft 1970).
82. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2502 (West 1999):
Murder.
(b) Murder of the second degree.-A criminal homicide constitutes murder of
the second degree when it is committed while defendant was engaged as a
principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony. . . . (d)
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never considered the
applicability of the recklessness default and homicide
default rules to felony murder. At least one lower court has
boldly asserted that, even after adoption of the Code, the
elements of felony murder in Pennsylvania are still given
by the common law.83
Only two Pennsylvania cases have addressed the mens
rea of felony murder since the 1973 adoption of the default
rules, and both do so only in passing.  In Commonwealth v.
DeHart, an intermediate Pennsylvania court justified the
use of enumerated felonies as aggravators for intentional
murder by positing that felony murder does not require
intent to kill.  But rather than clarifying the mental
element of felony murder, the court opined that “the intent
necessary to establish second degree murder is
constructively inferred from the malice incident to the
perpetration of an underlying felony.”84  The court relied,
however, on a decision concerning events that preceded the
1973 adoption of the default rules.85 On the other hand, the
decision of Commonwealth v. Hassein has implicitly
acknowledged the applicability of the homicide default rule
to felony murder, approving a jury instruction that
required proof that the perpetrator “intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently” caused the death of
the victim.86  In so doing, of course the court implied the
inapplicability of the recklessness default rule.  This
evasion of the recklessness default rule could be defended
on the basis of the “criminal homicide” variant of the
“implied culpability” strategy.  Following this strategy, the
court could have reasoned that the definition of criminal
Definitions.—As used in this section the following words and phrases shall
have the meanings given to them in this subsection: “Perpetration of a
felony.”  The act of the defendant in engaging in or being an accomplice in
the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or
attempting to commit robbery, rape, or deviate sexual intercourse by force
or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.
83. See Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 378 A.2d 1189, 1194 (Pa. 1977).
84. Commonwealth v. DeHart, 516 A.2d 656, 669 (Pa. 1986).
85. See Commonwealth v. Tarver, 426 A.2d 569 (Pa. 1981).
86. Commonwealth v. Hassein, 490 A.2d 438, 454 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
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homicide supplies the mental element of second degree
murder, so that there is no need to consult a general
default rule.  On this reasoning, criminal homicide is one
offense with a mens rea of negligence, which is graded on
the basis of aggravating circumstances or mental states.
Because the Hassein decision harmonizes with the statute
and the DeHart decision does not, Hassein should probably
be followed in Pennsylvania.
Another place to look for discussions of the mental
element of felony murder is in cases on causation of death,
because the Pennsylvania Code follows the Model Penal
Code in linking causation standards to mental elements.  It
requires, for example, foreseeability for negligent causation
of a result.87  Even for strict liability offenses, the
Pennsylvania Code requires that proscribed results be
“probable consequences” of the defendant’s conduct.88 One
fairly recent case held that foreseeability is not required for
causation of death in felony murder cases in Pennsylvania.
Remarkably,  however, the court did not cite the causation
provisions of the Code, and could point to no authority from
after the 1973 adoption of the code that was pertinent to
the issue.89 Obviously, if the Hassein jury instruction is
correct, and felony murder requires negligent causation of
death, then the requirements of causation are defined by
code section 3.03(c) which does indeed require
foreseeability.
Missouri’s felony murder provision poses a difficult
problem of interpretation because it defines the offense
unusually broadly,  while Missouri also has an unusually
elaborate scheme of default rules.  The felony murder
provision reads as follows:
1. A person commits the crime of murder in the second
degree if he:
87. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann §303(c) (West 1999).
88. Id. § 303(d).
89. Commonwealth v. Evans, 494 A.2d 383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
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(1) Knowingly causes the death of another person or, with
the purpose of causing serious physical injury to another
person, causes the death of another person; or  (2) Commits
or attempts to commit any felony, and, in the perpetration
or the attempted perpetration of such felony or in the flight
from the perpetration or attempted perpetration of such
felony, another person is killed as a result of the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of such felony or
immediate flight from the perpetration of such felony or
attempted perpetration of such felony. 90
Missouri  is unusual in that it does not restrict felony
murder by statute to enumerated felonies or felonies
dangerous to life.
Missouri has a culpability requirement that appears
pervasive, but could be read as nonpervasive.  It requires
culpability for the conduct, circumstance, or result
elements defining the offense, with an exception where
culpability would frustrate the purpose of the statute.
Missouri also has a knowledge default rule for offenses that
specify no culpability term at all and a distributive rule for
offenses that specify one culpable mental state without
assigning it to particular elements. On the other hand, for
offenses that specify a mental element for some but not all
elements, Missouri presumes strict liability with respect to
those elements.  Unfortunately, the arrangement of
Missouri’s second degree murder definition makes it
difficult to determine whether felony murder is a distinct
offense with its own definition, or is merely one alternative
form of the offense of second degree murder. If  felony
murder is a distinct offense with no specified culpable
mental state, the knowledge default rule would seem to
apply.  On the other hand, if we read the felony murder
clause as part of the definition of the offense of second
degree murder, in which culpability terms appear, felony
murder looks like a strict liability offense.
Plausible arguments of structure and purpose can be
marshaled for either interpretation.  Supporting strict
90. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.021 (1999).
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liability, there is the fact that if felony murder is construed
as a crime of culpability, it must also be a crime of
knowledge.  This would give it the same culpable mental
state as the crime of intentional second degree murder
defined in the first paragraph of section 565.021, and so
would render a separate definition of felony murder
superfluous.  It would also make Missouri one of the very
few states to require a mental element higher than
recklessness for murder in the course of dangerous felonies.
Supporting culpability, there is the fact that Missouri’s
felony murder definition is not statutorily predicated on a
narrow class of dangerous felonies, nor does it require an
act dangerous to life.  Thus if Missouri’s felony murder rule
is not read as requiring culpability, it becomes one of the
very few unrestricted felony murder rules in the country—
perhaps the only one.  Because the default rules create a
dilemma between the extremes of strict liability and
knowledge, they require Missouri to choose between two
versions of the rule which both seem to frustrate the likely
purposes of the statute defining the offense.
Because Missouri does not restrict felony murder by
statute to enumerated felonies or felonies dangerous to life
Missouri’s causation standards are particularly important
in determining the requisite culpability for felony murder.
Yet these causation standards are somewhat murky
because the controlling cases  involved the now defunct
offense of felony murder in the first degree, which was
restricted to killing in the course of enumerated dangerous
felonies.
Missouri courts have employed a proximate cause test
which inculpates all deaths foreseeably  resulting from a
felony.  This includes deaths resulting from resistance to
the felony, including the deaths of co-felons, because  such
resistance is a “foreseeable” and “natural” result of the
felony.  This foreseeability standard  was announced in two
opinions of the Missouri Supreme Court.91 This standard
91. See State v. Moore, 580 S.W.2d 747 (Mo. 1979); State v. Baker, 607 S.W.2d
153, 154 (Mo. 1980).
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remains controlling law, reiterated in State v. Blunt.92  The
difficulty is that Missouri courts have not seemed to
understand that a foreseeability standard  has exculpatory
as well as inculpatory implications. Thus in State v.
Colenburg, a Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s  second
degree  murder conviction for striking a two-year old child
with a stolen car, when the child ran into the street. The
theft had occurred seven months previously, but the
predicate felony was misappropriation of another’s
property or “tampering,” a continuing offense.  As a
dissenting opinion noted, the majority ignored the
statutory requirement of a causal relationship between the
felony and the death.93  As a result the majority never
considered whether such a death was rendered foreseeably
more probable as a result of the misappropriation of the
car.
A few Missouri cases have commented more directly on
the issue of the mental element of  felony murder.  A case
from the early 80’s, State v. O’Neal, construed first degree
felony murder as a crime of “strict liability.”94  This was
arguably true of first degree felony murder as it was then
defined.  Since all the predicate felonies for first degree
murder were inherently dangerous to life, participation in
all such felonies was negligent.  Hence,  it was true that “if
the actor has the requisite intent to commit or participate
in the underlying felony. . . no other mental state on his
part need be demonstrated.”95  In 1984, however, Missouri
eliminated first degree felony murder, so that O’Neal’s
pertinence as precedent should have expired. Nevertheless,
in State v. Norwood, a Missouri Court of Appeals cited
O’Neal’s statement in a second degree felony murder case,
although it also seemed to suggest that some further
culpability was required for felony murder beyond that
92. State v. Blunt, 863 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
93. See State v. Colenburg, 773 S.W.2d 184,190  (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
94. State v. O’Neal, 618 S.W.2d 31, 38 (Mo. 1981) (citing State v. Mullen, 528
S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)).
95. Id.
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required for complicity in the predicate felony.96
Alaska, New Jersey, and Illinois courts have relied on
legislative drafting commission commentaries to construe
their felony murder rules.
Alaska punishes causing death in the course and in
furtherance of enumerated dangerous felonies, or
participating with a street gang in a felony that causes
death, as second degree murder97  In Alaska, the crucial
issue is legislative intent, since the default rule permits the
imposition of strict liability where a legislative intent to do
so is “present.”  In Todd v. State,98 in holding that a felony
murderer could also be punished for the predicate felony,
the Alaska Supreme Court  commented on the legislature’s
intent in drafting Alaska’s felony murder provision.  The
court noted that until the current felony murder statute
was adopted in 1980, felony murder required intent to kill.
This was the traditional rule in Alaska, reconfirmed in the
1970 case of Gray v. State.99  The court quoted the following
passage from the drafter’s commentary to the new felony
murder provision:
In considering the Revised Code’s approach to the felony
murder statute, it must be recalled that the purpose of a
felony murder rule is to deter all killings during the
commission of felonies which involve a high potential for
violence.  By holding the felon liable for an unintended and
96. 721 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
97. See Alaska Stat § 11.41.110 (Michie 1998):
Murder in the Second Degree.  (a) A person commits the crime of murder in
the second degree if . . . (3) acting either alone or with one or more persons,
the person commits or attempts to commit arson in the first degree,
kidnapping, sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the second
degree, burglary in the first degree, escape in the first or second degree,
robbery in any degree, or misconduct involving a controlled substance . . .
and, in the course of or in furtherance of that crime, or in immediate flight
from that crime, any person causes the death of a person other than one of
the participants; or (4) acting with a criminal street gang, the person
commits or attempts to commit a crime that is a felony and, in the course of
or in furtherance of that crime or in immediate flight from that crime, any
person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants.
98. 917 P.2d 674 (Alaska 1996).
99. 463 P.2d 897, 906 (Alaska 1970).
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even accidental death occurring in the course of and in
furtherance of a felony, the rule provides a powerful
incentive not to commit inherently dangerous crimes, or at
the very least to plan and carry out such crimes with
increased regard for the physical dangers.  For all practical
purposes, Alaska does not now have a felony murder
rule . . . .  Consequently, an accidental killing occurring
during the commission of an enumerated felony does not
render the actor guilty of felony murder under the existing
statute.  Subsection (a)(3) specifically eliminates the Gray
requirement that a felon “purposely” kill during the
commission of an enumerated felony.100
This passage provides clear evidence that the
legislature intended to eliminate any requirement of
purpose to kill for felony murder.  But this would be the
automatic effect of a recklessness default rule.  Does it
show that the legislature clearly intended to eliminate any
requirement of culpability?  The term “accidental” in this
passage might be taken to mean nonculpable, but it might
simply mean unintentional.  The stated purpose of the rule,
deterring killing in the commission of dangerous felonies,
might be thought best served by a rule punishing those
who are recklessly aware of the risks they impose.  On the
other hand, the dangerousness of the predicate felony
might be thought to supply sufficient culpability and the
characterization of the rule as an incentive not to engage in
inherently dangerous crimes suggests that liability is
automatic for those whose enumerated felonies result in
death.  Thus, whether felony murder is a strict liability
crime or a crime of recklessness remains an open question
in Alaska.
New Jersey limits felony murder to enumerated
felonies and offers the same affirmative defense for
accomplices as North Dakota.101  New Jersey is unusual in
100. Todd, supra note 98, at 678-679 (quoting Alaska Criminal Code Revision,
Tentative Draft, pt. 1, pp. 27-29).
101. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3 (West 1995):
Murder.
a. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4 criminal homicide constitutes
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that it employs a pervasive knowledge default rule,
application of which would clearly eliminate the felony
murder rule.  Since New Jersey defines potential capital
murder in terms of knowledge or purpose and makes the
commission of a dangerous felony an aggravator,102
application of the knowledge default rule to felony murder
would make a hash of New Jersey’s murder law. A
murder when: . . .
(3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more
other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or
flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault,
arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, or criminal escape, and in the
course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person causes
the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any
prosecution under this subsection, in which the defendant was not the only
participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the
defendant: (a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit,
request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and (b)
Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or
substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of
a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and
(c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was
armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and (d) Had
no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to
engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.
102. See id. § 2C:11-3:
Murder: a. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4 criminal homicide
constitutes murder when: (1) The actor purposely causes death or serious
bodily injury resulting in death; or (2) The actor knowingly causes death or
serious bodily injury resulting in death. . . .  c. Any person convicted under
subsection a.(1) or (2) who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct;
or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by
payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value; or who, as
a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and
in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, commanded or
by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense, shall be
sentenced as provided hereinafter: . . . 
(2) (a) At the proceeding, the State shall have the burden of establishing
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating factors set
forth in paragraph (4) of this subsection. . . .
(4) The aggravating factors which may be found by the jury or the court
are. . . .
(g) The offense was committed while the defendant was engaged in the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or
attempting to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary or
kidnapping.
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requirement of knowledge for felony murder would make
all felony murders automatically death eligible, while the
structure of the statute clearly implies otherwise. In
addition, the presence of an affirmative defense for
accomplices in felonies that did not foreseeably lead to
death suggests that felony murder is otherwise a crime of
strict liability.  On the other hand,  New Jersey also
employs a variant of the homicide default rule which
clearly precludes strict liability and requires at least
recklessness for all homicide offenses.  These structural
features of the New Jersey Code support an argument that
application of the knowledge default rule would violate a
“contrary purpose” that “plainly appears,” even though this
contrary purpose is not explicit in the felony murder
definition itself.
In the face of these considerations, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has characterized felony murder as a crime
of strict liability, citing the statement of the Drafting
Commission to that effect,  but has nevertheless imposed a
foreseeability standard that it characterizes as a
requirement of negligence.  The controlling case is State v.
Martin.103  The Court pointed out that the New Jersey Code
follows the Model Penal Code in providing a special
causation standard for strict liability offenses, according to
which the prohibited result must be the “probable
consequence” of defendant’s conduct.  The court reasoned
that felony murder liability therefore requires that a death
must be “the probable consequence of the commission of the
felony.”104 In explicating this probable consequence
standard, the court equates it with “proximate cause,”105
endorses the prosecution’s view that this requires that
death be “foreseeable,”106 and the defense’s view that it may
not be “accidental,”107 and endorses an official comment on
103. 573 A.2d 1359 (N.J. 1990).
104. Id. at 1371.  See also Model Penal Code § 2.03(4) (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985).
105. State v. Martin, 573 A.2d at 1373.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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Model Penal Code section 2.06 equating the “probable
consequence” and “reasonably foreseeable” standards,  as
interchangeable  standards of “negligence.”108  The court
concludes that these sources indicate a legislative intent to
require “foreseeability,” but concedes that the legislature
deliberately avoided the term “proximate cause.”109  It
suggests instructing juries that felons can only be held
causally responsible for deaths that were not “too remote,
accidental in occurrence, or dependent on another’s volition
to have a just bearing on the defendant’s culpability.”110 The
court argues that a killing by one resisting an enumerated
dangerous felony would be justly punishable under this
standard because it would be “the foreseeable  result of the
risk created by the felon.”111
Thus, the court combines structural, historical and
instrumental considerations in evading the knowledge
default rule, but partially deferring to the homicide default
rule.  Ultimately, however, the court’s solution fails
because New Jersey’s version of the homicide default rule
clearly requires at least recklessness for “criminal
homicide” and its definition of felony murder defines it as
“criminal homicide” in the course of enumerated felonies.
Illinois has a pervasive recklessness default rule, with
an exception if a “legislative purpose” to impose strict
liability is “clearly” indicated in the statute itself.  Illinois
predicates first degree murder on killing by causing death
in the commission or attempt of a “forcible felony,” 112
108. Id. at 1374; see also Model Penal Code § 2.06 n.42, at 312 (Official Draft
and Revised Comments 1985).
109. State v. Martin, 573 A.2d at 1375.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. § 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/9-1 (West 1993):
First degree Murder . . . (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful
justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which
cause the death: (1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that
individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that
individual or another; or (2) he knows that such acts create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or
(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second
degree murder. . . .
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defined as a list of enumerated felonies “and any other
felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or
violence. . . .”113 Illinois courts have defined a forcible felony
as one which involves the use or threat of force under the
particular circumstances of its commission.114  The statute
does not of course “clearly” indicate a legislative intent to
impose strict liability.  Nevertheless, the conditioning of
felony murder on a “forcible” felony could be construed to
obviate any additional mental element, on the grounds that
culpability with respect to the risk of death is already
inherent in the use or threat of force.  This is really an
“implied culpability” strategy rather than an “explicit strict
liability” strategy.  Such an approach was taken by the
statute’s drafters and ultimately by the Illinois courts.
The felony murder statute was drafted by a committee
jointly appointed by the state Supreme Court and the state
Bar Association, which forwarded it to the legislature with
a report.  This report stated that:
while a good argument may be made for eliminating the
felony-murder provision altogether, it is well established in
Illinois to the extent of recognizing the forcible felony as so
inherently dangerous that a homicide occurring in the
course thereof, even though accidentally, should be held
without further proof to be within the ‘strong probability’
classification of murder.115
In People v. McEwen, an appellate court explained:
[I]n Illinois, a party acts with sufficient knowledge in a
murder case if  . . . he knows his conduct creates a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm. . . . [A] killing
constitutes felony murder where it is shown that an actor
intentionally brought about the death of another or that the
actor had knowledge that his conduct was practically certain
to cause death or created a strong possibility that death
113. Id. 5/2-8.
114. People v. Golson, 207 N.E.2d 68 (Ill. 1965).
115. §720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/9-1 (West 1993) (Criminal Code of 1961
Committee cmt. at 15) (emphasis added).
BINDERMACRO 1/10/01  2:23 PM
458 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:399
would result  . . . even if [death resulted] accidentally.116
The felony murder statute, as interpreted by the
Committee commentary, presumes knowledge of a strong
probability of bodily harm for forcible felonies.  Hence, it is
not really conditioned on recklessness, but rather on
negligence.  This notion of forcible felony is fraught with
difficulty.  In People v. Smith, for example, defendants  ran
over a victim while speeding away after being interrupted
while burglarizing railroad cars.  The only “force” used
during this burglary was the collision itself.117  Illinois
courts have consistently defined causation of death in
terms of proximate cause, requiring that death be a “direct
and foreseeable consequence” of a forcible felony.118
Unfortunately, Illinois courts have not always taken the
requirement of foreseeable causation seriously as a
limitation on liability. 119
Note that not a single state supreme court has actually
applied recklessness default rules to construe a felony
murder provision that is silent as to mens rea, although
North Dakota has not yet considered the question.  Only
the New Jersey courts adverted to the general default
rules, while one Pennsylvania decision referred implicitly
to the homicide default rule.
B.  Pervasive Negligence or Homicide Default States
Next, let us consider four states that would appear to
have pervasive negligence rules or homicide default rules:
New York, Alabama, Texas, and Oregon.
New York has a pervasive negligence default rule with
a “clear legislative intent” exception and a “necessarily
involved” culpability rule.  New York has had no cases
116. People v. McEwen, 510 N.E.2d 74, 78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (citing People v.
Guest, 503 N.E.2d 255 (Ill. 1986)).
117. People v. Smith,  713 N.E.2d 140 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
118. People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 977 (Ill. 1997).
119. See People v. Davis, 527 N.E.2d 552, 557 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); People v.
Jenkins, 545 N.E.2d 986, 995 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
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addressing the applicability of these rules to felony murder.
New York does predicate felony murder on enumerated
dangerous felonies and provides a defense for accomplices
to felonies resulting in unforeseeable deaths.120  New York
courts have two stratagems available for evading the
default negligence rule.  One is a structural argument that
the affirmative defense for accomplices manifests a “clear
legislative intent” to impose strict liability.  An implied
culpability argument is also available.  A court could argue
that juries need not separately find negligence with respect
to the risk of death because all of the predicate felonies
“necessarily involve” such negligence.  On the other hand,
the “necessarily involved” rule could be a source of an
argument for culpability, on the ground that “causing”
death requires that death is foreseeable, and so
presupposes negligence.  The New York Penal Law has no
general provisions on causation, but New York cases have
made clear that causation of death requires
foreseeability.121  This has been confirmed in the context of
felony murder.122
120. See N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 (McKinney 1998):
Murder in the second degree. A person is guilty of murder in the second
degree when: . . . 3. Acting either alone or with one or more other persons,
he commits or attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson,
rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first
degree, aggravated sexual abuse, escape in the first degree, or escape in the
second degree, and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of
immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if there be any,
causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that
in any prosecution under this subdivision, in which the defendant was not
the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense
that the defendant: (a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way
solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof;
and (b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or
substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of
a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and (c)
Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed
with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and (d) Had no
reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage
in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury; . . . .
121. See People v. Kibbe, 321 N.E. 2d 773 (N.Y. 1974).
122. See People v. Matos, 634 N.E.2d 157 (N.Y. 1994); People v. Hernandez,
624 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1993).
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Alabama’s scheme of default rules is very similar to
New York’s.  One significant difference is that while the
Alabama Code classifies offenses as strict liability if they
lack culpability with respect to any element, it also
classifies offenses as offenses of culpability if they require
culpability with respect to any element.  Thus, it is less
clear that Alabama’s presumption of culpability is
pervasive.  On the other hand, Alabama has the homicide
default rule.  Like New York, Alabama has the “necessarily
involved” rule.  All three rules would be satisfied by a
mental element of negligence.  The current Alabama
statute conditions felony murder liability on causing death
in the course of enumerated dangerous felonies “or any
other felony clearly dangerous to human life.”123  The
official commentary on this provision explains this
requirement of dangerousness to life as a requirement of
foreseeability and reasons that an unrestricted felony
murder rule—punishing unforeseeable deaths—is no
longer defensible.  At the same time, the commentators
decline to require “subjective” awareness of the risk of
death.124  Thus, without mentioning the negligence default
123. Ala. Code §13A-6-1 (1994) (“Definitions. The following terms shall have
the meanings ascribed to them by this section: (1) Homicide. A person commits
criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal
negligence causes the death of another person. . . . (3) Criminal homicide. Murder,
manslaughter, or criminally negligent homicide.”).
See also id. § 13A-6-2:
Murder.(a) A person commits the crime of murder if: . . . (3) He commits or
attempts to commit arson in the first degree, burglary in the first or second
degree, escape in the first degree, kidnapping in the first degree, rape in
the first degree, robbery in any degree, sodomy in the first degree or any
other felony clearly dangerous to human life and, in the course of and in
furtherance of the crime that he is committing or attempting to commit, or
in immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant if there be any,
causes the death of any person.
124. See Ala. Code § 13A-6-2 cmt. at 256 (1994):
Under a wholly unrestricted felony-murder rule, defendants may be held
liable for the most serious crime known, which was neither intended nor
foreseeable.  The underlying rationale that defendant has shown himself to
be a rationale that defendant has shown himself to be a “bad person,” and
that this is enough to exclude arguments bearing on the gravity of the
harm actually committed, probably was more defensible at early common
law when legal conceptions were rotted in simpler moral attitudes. Today a
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rules, the official commentary appears to reconcile the
felony murder rule with them.  No Alabama felony murder
cases have considered whether mental culpability is
required with respect to the risk of death.125
Felony murder poses a particularly complex
interpretive problem in Texas, meriting extensive
discussion.  Texas has an apparently nonpervasive
recklessness rule and  a homicide default rule.  Section 6.02
of the Texas Penal Code provides the conduct defining all
offenses must be committed with the culpable mental state
of intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence with
respect to the conduct required by the definition the
offense, unless the definition of an offense “plainly
dispenses with any mental element.”  It further provides
that if no mental element is specified in the definition of an
offense, a mental element of recklessness, knowledge, or
intent must be inferred.  Section 6.03 (c) implies however,
that conduct is reckless only if it is reckless with respect to
a result or attendant circumstance.  In the face of this
murky default rule scheme, the Texas courts appear to
have developed a practice of classifying offenses as either
“conduct” offenses or “result” offenses, and therefore
requiring culpability with respect to either the conduct or
result only.  This practice of arbitrarily categorizing some
objective elements as essential and others as inessential
frustrates the purpose of the Model Penal Code culpability
scheme, which was designed to avoid this sort of
unpredictable, ad hoc construction of the mental element of
offenses.  And the scheme of “conduct offenses” and “result
more dominant rationale in the justification of, at least, a restricted version
of the rule is that defendant has shown that he is a “dangerous person”
who has knowingly engaged in a dangerous crime that by its very nature is
highly susceptible of causing death and which, in fact, did cause death.
Such departure from a subjective test of criminal liability is justified for the
protection of the public.
125. One Alabama case cites Wharton to the effect that the felony murder
doctrine involves a “transfer” of malice from an intended felony to an unintended
death.  Yet the holding in the case is that felony murderers must intend to
commit the felony, not that they need have no culpability at all with respect to
death.  See Bates v. State, 461 So.2d 5 (Ala. 1984).
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offenses” proves very awkward in dealing with Texas’
unusually complex definition of felony murder.
Texas Penal Code section 19.02(b)(3) defines murder
as including causing death by committing or attempting an
act clearly dangerous to human life in the course of and in
furtherance of committing or attempting a felony other
than manslaughter.126  Is this a “conduct offense?”  Is this a
“result offense?”  On its face the offense involves two
conduct elements: “commits or attempts to commit a
felony,” and “commits or attempts to commit an act clearly
dangerous to human life.”  The danger to human life
appears to be an attendant circumstance, and the clarity of
the danger could be either a circumstance element or a
mental element (of negligence or recklessness).  “Causing
death” is a result element.  Supporting a characterization
of section 19.02(a)(3) murder as a “result crime” is the fact
that section 19.01 classifies murder as a form of criminal
homicide which it defines as “intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, or with criminal negligence caus[ing] the death
of an individual.”
Taking the culpability requirement of section 6.02 at
face value, it applies to all conduct elements required by
the definition the offense, unless that definition plainly
dispenses with a requirement of mens rea.  Since
committing an act dangerous to life is such a conduct
element it would appear to require a mental state.  Does
the code specify the mental element in requiring that the
act be “clearly” dangerous?  If “clearly” dangerous means
that the danger must be clear to the defendant, then the
act must be reckless.  If clearly dangerous means the
danger must be clear to the average or reasonable person
126. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.01 (West  1977):
Offenses against the person chapter 19.  Criminal Homicide. (b) A person
commits an offense if he . . . .
(3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and
in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in
immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts
to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of
an individual.
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then the act must be negligent.  If “clearly” is not a
culpable mental state, however, then no mental state is
specified and the act must be committed recklessly with
respect to either the result element of causing death or the
circumstance element of dangerousness to life.  Does the
Code specify any mental element with respect to the result
element of causing death?  Had the Code used the term of
art “criminal homicide” (as the Pennsylvania Code does) it
would have arguably defined the mental element as
negligence.  But it did not use this term of art in the
definition of murder itself.
On the other hand, can it be said that the Code
“plainly” dispenses with a mental element for felony
murder?  The requirement that the felony murderer
commit an act “clearly dangerous to human life” and the
definition of  “criminal homicide” as including murder and
requiring the culpable causation of death precludes any
conclusion that the text plainly dispenses with a mental
element.  While the Texas culpability requirement involves
an exception for clear statements in the text rather than for
clear expressions of legislative intent, there is one relevant
legislative historical datum.  A “practice commentary”
written by attorneys involved in the drafting of the Code
and based on “committee comments” circulated to
legislators with  drafts of the code was published with the
code.  The comment on what is now section 19.02 (b)(3)
stated that:
Although it may contract the scope of the [preexisting]
felony murder doctrine, the chief aim of Section 19.02(a)(3)
is clarification.  Under it the mere attempt or commission of
a felony no longer suffices to construct intent or knowledge:
the actor must kill while attempting or committing an act
clearly dangerous to human life in the course or furtherance
of the felony or in immediate flight therefrom.  As most
felony murder prosecutions today involve killings committed
while the felon is engaged in highly dangerous conduct,
however, section 19.02 (a)(3)’s restatement of the doctrine
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will probably effect little change in practice.127
Does this passage “plainly” indicate a legislative intent
to retain the common law felony murder rule and dispense
with mens rea with respect to the risk of death?  Hardly.  It
opines that the addition of new elements to the offense will
make little difference to the success of felony murder
prosecutions.  Such a statement has no purpose unless the
traditional definition of felony murder is being changed by
the addition of new elements.  It does not clarify whether
the new statute requires more elements in order to
“construct intent or knowledge” or whether it substitutes a
mens rea of negligence or recklessness for constructed
intent.
In the 1977 case of State v. Rodriguez,128 a Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals issued a confused opinion construing
the felony murder provision according to a theory of
transferred intent.  The Court stated:
From a consideration of these sections together, it logically
follows that because s 19.02(a)(3) is silent as to, and does
not plainly dispense with, the culpable mental state
required for the underlying felony committed or attempted,
s 6.02(b) mandates that the culpable mental state shall . . .
be one of intent, knowledge, or recklessness.  Upon the
establishment of the underlying committed or attempted
felony embracing the requisite mental element, s 19.02(a)(3)
then declares that an act which is committed in the course
and in furtherance of, or in immediate flight from, the
underlying committed or attempted felony and which is
clearly dangerous to human life and causes death shall
constitute murder.  Thus, the culpable mental state for the
act of murder is supplied by the underlying committed or
attempted felony giving rise to the act.  The transference of
the mental element establishing criminal responsibility for
the original act to the resulting act conforms to and
preserves the traditional mens rea requirement of the
127. State v. Kuykendall, 609 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
128. 548 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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common law.129
This passage presents several problems.  First, the
“traditional mens rea requirement of the common law”
seems irrelevant in light of the then recent passage of a
code specifying the mental elements of offenses.  Second,
and more important, the commission of a felony is not the
only “conduct” element defining the offense.  Committing
an act clearly dangerous to human life is also a conduct
element requiring a culpable mental state (if indeed “clear
danger” is not itself a culpable mental state).  One could
read the above passage to require that these conduct
elements be accompanied by the same culpable mental
state as the predicate felony, except for the fact that the
court approved a jury instruction requiring only a finding
that the predicate felony be committed intentionally.  This
instruction did not require intentional imposition of danger
or intentional causation of death.130  The Rodriguez court
used the transferred intent variant of the implied
culpability strategy for evading the Texas Code’s default
rules.  The Rodriguez court appeared to treat felony
murder neither as a “conduct offense” nor as a “result
offense.”  In defiance of section 6.02, the court apparently
ignored the language “defining the offense” and simply
preserved the common law understanding of felony murder.
On the other hand, Rodriguez might be read to require that
the predicate felony must involve a culpable mental state of
recklessness with respect to the risk of death.  If so, then
culpability could indeed be “transferred” from the predicate
felony to the resulting death without violating the Code’s
culpability scheme, because the requisite culpability for the
predicate felony would already include culpability with
respect to the resulting death.
Three years later, in Kuykendall v. State, a criminal
appeals court held that “[c]riminally negligent homicide
being a potentially lesser included offense in [intentional
129. Id. at 28-29.
130. See id. at 29.
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and intent to injure murder,]. . . it is likewise a prospective
lesser included offense of felony murder. . . .” 131  The court
rejected the state’s argument that “‘an act clearly
dangerous to human life’ and conduct amounting to
criminal negligence [are] distinctly different and unrelated
facts.”132  The court disapproved the following analysis:
In determining whether or not a person acts with criminal
negligence the fact finder is asked to determine whether
the actor ought to have been aware that under the
circumstances his conduct posed a substantial and
unjustifiable risk constituting a gross deviation from
ordinary care.  Stated another way, whether the actor
should have known or foreseen the results of his conduct.
No such inquiry is made by the fact-finder in determining
any of the elements of felony-murder.  The essence of the
felony murder doctrine is that when an individual is
engaged in the commission of a felony, he is responsible for
the results of his conduct as a matter of law. . . .133
The Kuykendall court thereby implied that causing
death as a result of committing an act clearly dangerous
entails foreseeably—and so negligently—causing death.
The following year, however, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed field again in Ex parte Easter.134
Easter objected to a murder indictment which charged him
with causing a baby’s death by an act clearly dangerous to
human life in the course of committing the felony of
negligent injury to a child.  The indictment did not specify
that he must have acted culpably in committing the act
clearly dangerous to human life.  Citing Rodriguez, the
court held that “[t]he felony murder rule as now embodied
in the present Penal Code dispenses with inquiry into the
mens rea accompanying the homicide itself.  The
underlying felony—here the injury to a child—supplies the
131. Kuykendall, 609 S.W.2d at 796.
132. Id. at 795.
133. Id.
134. Ex parte Easter, 615 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
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necessary culpable mental state.”135  The court supported
this conclusion with the language of the Practice
Commentary to the effect that section 19.02(3) promised
little change “in practice” from prior law,136 and the “well-
settled” principle that “one who, intending to commit a
felony, accidentally commits another felony, is guilty of the
felony actually committed.”137  This archaic principle of
strict liability for all unintended consequences of felonies
is, of course antithetical to the Model Penal Code’s
culpability scheme.  It is a form of the confusing doctrine of
“general intent” that the Model Penal Code’s element
analysis was designed to eliminate.  The principle was
stated in the 1979 case of  Honea v. State in which, the
court added that “the intent to commit the contemplated
offense transfers to the offense in fact committed.” 138  In
support of this claim, however, the court cited only an
irrelevant Code provision on the transfer of causal
responsibility, not culpability.139  The Practice Commentary
implies that this section does not even deal with the special
causal issues arising in felony murder, referring the reader
instead to the murder provision.140  The Honea and Easter
decisions simply ignore the language of the M.P.C.-
inspired141 Code in preserving the pre-code jurisprudence of
transferred intent.
Ignoring the implication of Kuykendall that felony
murder requires a culpable mental state of negligence,
lower courts have repeated the transferred intent formula
135. Id. at 721.
136. Id. (citing Kuykendall, which in turn cites the practice comment).
137. Id. at 720 (citing Honea v. State, 585 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. Crim, App.
1979)).
138. Id.
139. See id. (citing V.T.C.A.  Title 5, Section 6.04 (a):
his conduct . . . (b) A person is nevertheless criminally responsible for
causing a result if the only difference between what actually occurred and
what he desired, contemplated or risked is that: (1) a different offense was
committed; or a person is criminally responsible if the result would not
have occurred but for (2) a different person or property was injured,
harmed, or otherwise affected.).
140. V.T.C.A.  1 Penal (1974) 94 (Section 6.04 practice cmt.).
141.  Seth S. Searcy III, Foreword, V.T.C.A. 1 Penal (1974) XV.
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of Rodriguez and Easter, at least in dicta.  Thus in Mackey
v. State,142 a court upheld a felony murder conviction
appealed because of a failure to instruct on the lesser
included offense of negligent homicide.  While the holding
was that defendant’s act dangerous to life (leaving an
infant by the side of the road) was undoubtedly committed
in the course and in furtherance of his auto theft felony, the
court unnecessarily implied that the entire mens rea of
murder was supplied by the mens rea of auto theft, without
considering the possibility of a compound mens rea.143
Similarly, in Cooper v. State, 144  a court cited Mackey
and Rodriguez for the proposition that “in felony murder
cases, the culpable mental state for the act of murder is
supplied by the mental state accompanying the underlying
committed or attempted felony giving rise to the act.”145
Yet if Kuykendall remains authoritative, this proposition is
only half true: Since the negligence implied by the
commission of an act clearly dangerous to human life
cannot by itself suffice to establish murder, the additional
culpability required for murder is supplied by the mental
state accompanying the predicate felony.  In any case, the
transferred intent formula is dictum in Cooper.  The trial
court had instructed the jury to find Cooper liable for
murder in the course of the felony of injury to a child, only
if he both recklessly injured the child and recklessly
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life.146  On
appeal, the Cooper court overturned the conviction because
the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury that acting
recklessly meant acting recklessly with respect to a result
or circumstance, whereas Cooper could only be guilty of
recklessly committing an act clearly dangerous to life in the
course of recklessly injuring a child if he were reckless with
respect to results alone.147  But which results?  Only injury?
142. 811 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. App. 1991).
143. See id. at 645.
144. 842 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App. 1992).
145. Id. at 421.
146. See id. at 419-20.
147. See id. at 421.
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Or also death? The court does not clarify whether it
accepted the trial court’s assumption that the act
dangerous to life requires its own mens rea.  Nor does it
clarify whether it understood Rodriguez to restrict
predicate felonies to those involving recklessness with
respect to death.  Thus Cooper left the mens rea of felony
murder in Texas more confused than ever.
A recent case, also entitled State v. Rodriguez,148
involves an extensive discussion of the development of
Texas felony murder law.  While the case concerns the
issue of merger rather than the mens rea of felony murder,
the court rejects the language of “transferred intent” as a
confusing “fiction” and instead explains section 19.02(b)(3)
as “a separate mode of first degree murder, a distinct crime
for which the killing did not have a separate mens rea
element apart from the felony.  No transferred intent was
required.”149  The court further commented:
The more recent trend has been to abandon the fiction of
implied malice. . . . Most statutes and courts now frankly
characterize a homicide as murder if the killer acted with
reckless and wanton disregard of an obvious risk to human
life.  This is exactly what our legislature did in enacting the
third mode of first degree murder in section 19.02 (b)(3).150
Unfortunately, however, the court does not clarify to what
objective element—the predicate felony, the dangerous act,
or the resulting death—this requirement of a reckless and
wanton disregard of an obvious risk to human life attaches.
Nor does it clarify the role of the default rules.  With this
second Rodriguez decision, however, the Texas courts
appear to have shifted from a transferred intent variant of
an implied culpability strategy, to a dangerousness variant.
Oregon has a homicide default rule and a negligence
rule that appears pervasive.  This rule resembles Model
Penal Code section 2.02(1) except that instead of saying
148. 953 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App. 1997).
149. Id. at 349.
150. Id. at 353-54.
BINDERMACRO 1/10/01  2:23 PM
470 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:399
“unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or
negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each
material element of the offense,”151 it says “unless the
person acts with a culpable mental state with respect to
each material element of the offense that necessarily
requires a culpable mental state.”152 Oregon punishes
“criminal homicide” as murder if committed in the course of
various forms of the traditional enumerated felonies plus
arson, bombing, escape, kidnapping, and “compelling
prostitution.”153 Oregon also provides an affirmative
defense for accomplices to the felony who neither kill nor
foresee the homicidal act.154  The Oregon courts have not
151. Model Penal Code § 2.02(1) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
152. Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.095 (1999).
153. Id. § 163.115 (1):
Except as provided in § 163.118 and 163.125, criminal homicide constitutes
murder: . . . (b) When it is committed by a person, acting either alone or
with one or more persons, who commits or attempts to commit any of the
following crimes and in the course of and in furtherance of the crime the
person is committing or attempting to commit, or during the immediate
flight therefrom, the person, or another participant if there be any, causes
the death of a person other than one of the participants:
(A) Arson in the first degree as defined in § 164.325;
(B) Criminal mischief in the first degree by means of an explosive as
defined in § 164.365;
(C) Burglary in the first degree as defined in § 164.225;
(D) Escape in the first degree as defined in § 162.165;
(E) Kidnapping in the second degree as defined in § 163.225;
(F) Kidnapping in the first degree as defined in § 163.235;
(G) Robbery in the first degree as defined in § 164.415;
(H) Any felony sexual offense in the first degree defined in this chapter;
(I) Compelling prostitution as defined in § 167.017; or
(J) Assault in the first degree, as defined in § 163.185, and the victim is
under 14 years of age, or assault in the second degree, as defined in §
163.175 (1)(a) or (b), and the victim is under 14 years of age;. . . .
154. See id. § 163.115(3):
It is an affirmative defense to a charge of violating subsection (1)(b) of this
section that the defendant:
(a)  Was not the only participant in the underlying crime;
(b) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request,
command, importune, cause or aid in the commission thereof;
(c)  Was not armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon;
Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed
BINDERMACRO 1/10/01  2:23 PM
2000] MENS REA DEFAULT RULES 471
treated the homicide default rule as having any
significance independent of the requirement of a dangerous
predicate felony.  In the 1981 case of State v. Reams,  the
Oregon Supreme Court reasoned that predicating felony
murder liability on enumerated crimes was an effort to
limit liability to killing in the course of crimes the
legislature deemed inherently dangerous to human life.155
Yet in State v. Burnell, the Court of Appeals stated that
“the felony murder statute . . . requires an intent to commit
the underlying felony, but has no mens rea causation of
death requirement.” 156  In effect, the Oregon scheme treats
killing in the course of a dangerous felony as requiring the
jury to find at least negligence, absent rebuttal by means of
the affirmative defense.  By contrast, the Model Penal Code
treats killing in the course of a dangerous felony as
permitting—but not requiring—a finding of recklessness
and extreme indifference to human life.
All four of our four pervasive negligence states
condition felony murder on inherently dangerous felonies
or, in the case of Texas, felonies committed by means of
acts inherently dangerous to life.  Thus all four felony
murder statutes are basically compatible with the default
rules.  Only in Texas has the judiciary explicitly considered
the significance of the state’s general default rules for the
felony murder provision.  Even while acknowledging the
applicability of these default rules, the Texas courts have
resisted them by reverting to pre-Code concepts of
“transferred intent.” The recent Rodriguez decision,
however, abandons transferred intent in favor of
characterizing the Texas felony murder rule as implying
culpability through the requirement of an act dangerous to
life.
with a dangerous or deadly weapon; and
(d)  Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant
intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death.
155. 636 P.2d 913, 917 (Or. 1981).
156. 877 P.2d 1228, 1229 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
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C.  Nonpervasive States
Finally, let us consider the problem of interpreting
felony murder provisions in four states with nonpervasive
culpability default rules: Kansas, Ohio, Utah, and Colorado
Kansas predicates first degree murder on either
intentional and premeditated killing or killing in the
commission, attempt, or flight from enumerated
“inherently dangerous” felonies.157  There is no second
157. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3401 (1981):
Murder in the first degree. Murder in the first degree is the killing of a
human being committed:
(a) Intentionally and with premeditation; or (b) in the commission of,
attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as
defined in § 21-3436 and amendments thereto. . . .
§ 21-3436. Inherently dangerous felony; definition. (a) Any of the
following felonies shall be deemed an inherently dangerous felony
whether or not such felony is so distinct from the homicide alleged to be
a violation of subsection (b) of section 21-3401 and amendments thereto
as not to be an ingredient of the homicide alleged to be a violation of
subsection (b) of section 21-3401 and amendments thereto:
(1) Kidnapping, as defined in section 21-3420 and amendments thereto;
(2) aggravated kidnapping, as defined in section 21-3421 and
amendments thereto;
(3) robbery, as defined in section 21-3426 and amendments thereto;
(4) aggravated robbery, as defined in section 21-3427 and amendments
thereto;
(5) rape, as defined in section 21-3502 and amendments thereto;
(6) aggravated criminal sodomy, as defined in section 21-3506 and
amendments thereto;
(7) abuse of a child, as defined in section 21-3609 and amendments
thereto;
(8) felony theft under subsection (a) or (c) of section 21-3701 and
amendments thereto;
 (9) burglary, as defined in section 21-3715 and amendments thereto;
(10) aggravated burglary, as defined in section 21-3716 and
amendments thereto;
(11) arson, as defined in section 21-3718 and amendments thereto;
(12) aggravated arson, as defined in section 21-3719 and amendments
thereto;
(13) treason, as defined in section 21-3801 and amendments thereto;
(14) any felony offense as provided in section 65-4127a, 65-4127b or 65-
4159 or 1995 Supp. section 65-4160 through section 65-4164 and
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degree felony murder.158  Kansas requires criminal intent or
recklessness for every offense, with intent as the default
mental state but does not specify that a culpable mental
state is required for every element.
These default rules were introduced into the Kansas
Code in 1969, before Kansas restricted felony murder to
enumerated felonies.  Kansas cases varied in their
construction of the culpability required for felony murder
until the legislature predicated the offense on inherently
dangerous felonies.  In State v. Osbey, decided four years
after the introduction of the default rules, the Kansas
Supreme Court held that while the felony substitutes for
premeditation in raising murder to the first degree, the
jury must still find malicious killing in order to find
murder.  The court approved an instruction to that effect,
which in turn defined maliciously as  “willfully” (and hence
“intentionally”) doing a “wrong act.”159  In the companion
amendments thereto; and
(15) any felony offense as provided in section 21-4219 and amendments
thereto.
(b) Any of the following felonies shall be deemed an inherently
dangerous felony only when such felony is so distinct from the homicide
alleged to be a violation of subsection (b) of section 21-3401 and
amendments thereto as to not be an ingredient of the homicide alleged
to be a violation of subsection (b) of section 21-3401 and amendments
thereto:
(1) murder in the first degree, as defined in subsection (a) of section 21-
3401 and amendments thereto;
(2) murder in the second degree, as defined in subsection (a) of section
21-3402 and amendments thereto;
(3) voluntary manslaughter, as defined in subsection (a) of section 21-
3403 and amendments thereto;
(4) aggravated assault, as defined in section 21-3410 and amendments
thereto;
(5) aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer, as defined in section
21-3411 and amendments thereto;
(6) aggravated battery, as defined in subsection (a)(1) of section 21-3414
and amendments thereto; and
(7) aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer, as defined in
section 21-3415 and amendments thereto.
158. See id. § 21-3402.
159. 517 P.2d 141, 148-49 (Kan. 1973). This formula is somewhat ambiguous:
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case of State v. Reed, however, the court implied that any
homicide in the course of, and directly resulting from, the
commission of a felony inherently dangerous to human life
sufficed.160  In State v. Branch, the court was forced to
clarify the mens rea of felony murder when confronted with
a defendant’s claim to have shot a victim “accidentally”
during an armed robbery.  Rejecting defendant’s claim as
irrelevant, the court held that “a requirement of the felony
murder rule is that the participants in the felony could
reasonably foresee or expect that a life might be taken in
perpetration of such a felony.”  Murder liability is imposed
on those who commit dangerous felonies “knowing full well
the possible tragic results.”161  Thus an inherently
dangerous felony was necessary to demonstrate a mental
state of recklessness or negligence.  In State v. Smith, the
court understood Branch to require actual foresight on the
part of the participants, of the possibility of a death,
suggesting recklessness.162  In State v. Underwood,
however, the court followed the reasoning of Wharton’s
treatise163 that the felony murder doctrine involves a
“transfer” of intent from a felony dangerous to human life
to a resulting death, and held that the offense of possession
of a firearm by an ex-felon could not serve as a predicate
felony because it was neither foreseeably dangerous nor a
crime of intent.164  The court further held that the
dangerousness of an offense should be viewed in the
abstract, so that if the offense is not generally dangerous to
human life, it cannot serve as a predicate felony.165  In State
v. Lashley, the court characterized an instruction’s
requirement that the prosecution prove malice in a felony
could one kill maliciously by willfully committing a wrongful act that accidentally
causes death?  Such a reading of “malicious killing” seems strained, but not
impossible.
160. 520 P.2d 1314, 1316 (Kan. 1974).
161. State v. Branch, 573 P.2d 1041, 1042 (Kan. 1978).
162. 594 P.2d 218 (Kan. 1979).
163. See 2 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 146, at 210 (14th ed. 1979).
164. See State v. Underwood, 615 P.2d 153, 160-61 (Kan. 1980).
165. Id. at 162.
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murder case as “erroneous.”166  But it also understood the
Underwood court to have required that predicate felonies
fit into a statutory category  of “forcible felonies,” despite
concluding oddly that theft should be viewed as a forcible
felony.167  A later decision held that as there is nothing
inherently forcible or violent about the sale of cocaine or its
accompanying intent, it cannot be a predicate felony.168
“The intent being transferred or presumed is not
recklessness—it is premeditation, malice, etc.  The
determinative factor of [prior cases precluding felony
murder liability] was . . . that there was no active violence
as part of the crimes; no threat of violence against the
persons present.”169
Ultimately, in 1992, the legislature accepted Lashley’s
invitation to amend the statute to require an inherently
dangerous felony.  It enumerated these felonies and
included both theft and drug-dealing.  In sum, the caselaw
in Kansas appeared to have required some level of
culpability with respect to death.  The required culpability
appeared to be recklessness or negligence rather than the
default standard of intent, but the courts characterized the
requisite culpability as a transferred intent to do violence.
Such a “transferred intent” notion may even be legitimate
in applying a nonpervasive culpability requirement and
default rule.  Throughout this jurisprudence, however, the
Kansas courts have made no reference to the default rules.
Like Illinois, New Jersey, and Alabama, Ohio courts
have drawn inferences about the legislative history of
homicide statutes in order to construe their mental
elements.  Ohio has a recklessness default rule but no
pervasive culpability rule.  Until 1998, Ohio had no felony
murder, based on the 1857 case of Robbins v. State, in
which the Ohio Supreme Court read the murder statute to
require  purpose to kill for murders in the perpetration or
166. 664 P.2d 1358 (Kan. 1983).
167. See id. at 1368-70; see also State v. Hoang, 755 P.2d 7, 9 (Kan. 1988);
State v. Wesson 802 P. 2d 574, 579 (Kan. 1990).
168. See State v. Wesson, 802 P.2d at 579.
169. Id.
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attempt of a felony.170  Ohio recently revised its homicide
provisions, creating a crime of felony murder for the first
time, defined as “caus[ing] the death of another as a
proximate result of the offender’s committing or attempting
to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of the first
or second degree” other than manslaughter.171
Ohio courts have not yet construed this provision.  Yet
the new felony murder provision mimics the language in an
older felony manslaughter provision, which however
applies to all felonies, not only especially heinous ones.  In
State v. Losey, an Ohio appeals court construed this felony
manslaughter provision as follows:
In rejecting the concept of reckless homicide and opting
instead to retain unlawful act manslaughter in R.C.
2903.04, the General Assembly manifested its purpose to
adopt the traditional concept of transferred intent in the
instance of involuntary manslaughter.  In doing so, the
General Assembly specified the “degree of culpability”
alluded to in R.C. 2901.21(B).172
The court here adverts to the fact that the Code’s drafting
committee proposed, and one house of the Ohio legislature
passed, a reckless manslaughter statute largely based on
the Model Penal Code provision but that the other house
rejected this in favor of  the language ultimately adopted.173
This is a rare instance of an explicit effort to reconcile
170. 8 Ohio St. 131 (1857).
171. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.02 (1999):
  (A) No person shall purposely cause the death of another or the unlawful
termination of another’s pregnancy.
  (B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the
offender’s committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is
a felony of the first or second degree and that is not a violation of section
2903.03 or 2903.04 [manslaughter provisions] of the Revised Code.
  (C) Division (B) of this section does not apply to an offense that becomes a
felony of the first or second degree only if the offender previously has been
convicted of that offense or another specified offense.
   (D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of murder. . . .
172. 491 N.E.2d 379, 384 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
173. See Jeffrey M. Goldsmith, Involuntary Manslaughter: Review and
Commentary on Ohio Law, 40 Ohio St. L.J. 569 (1979).
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transferred intent with a mens rea default rule.  Because
the Ohio default rule is nonpervasive, the court was able to
avoid characterizing the felony manslaughter provision as
a strict liability offense, and claiming that the statute
“plainly indicated” a purpose of imposing strict liability.
Thus Ohio, like Kansas, adopts the transferred intent
version of the implied culpability strategy.  In both cases,
the strategy is defensible because both states have
nonpervasive default rules.  The Losey court also construed
“proximate cause” to require “foreseeability” and
“reasonable inevitability”174 but found it present where a
victim died of a heart attack on discovering that a door had
been forced by burglars who had left the scene.175
Since 1995, Utah has recognized only one degree of
noncapital murder.  The Utah Code includes within this
category causing the death of anyone other than an
accomplice, in the commission or attempt of a number of
enumerated felonies.  These include various forms of the
traditional enumerated felonies plus kidnapping, and child
abuse.176  Utah presents an ambiguous scheme of default
rules.  They require that every offense involve “acting” with
a culpable mental state unless the statute defining the
offense indicates a legislative intent to impose liability
without proof of any culpable mental state.  It is of course
possible to argue that the failure to specify any mental
element for felony murder implies an intention to impose
strict liability, particularly where other forms of murder
174. 491 N.E.2d at 382
175. Accord Stanley v. Turner, 6 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 1993).
176. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1999):
Murder.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the actor: . . .
(d) while in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight
from the commission or attempted commission of aggravated robbery,
robbery, rape, object rape, forcible sodomy, or aggravated sexual assault,
aggravated arson, arson, aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated
kidnapping, kidnapping, child kidnapping, rape of a child, object rape of a
child, sodomy upon a child, forcible sexual abuse, sexual abuse of a child,
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, or child abuse, as defined in Subsection
76-5-109 (2)(a), when the victim is younger than 14 years of age, causes the
death of another person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202;
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are defined by reference to culpable mental states.
Militating against this reading of the felony murder
provision is the definition of criminal homicide as causing
death with intent, knowledge, recklessness, negligence or
some other culpable mental state specified in the statute
defining the offense.177  Since no such culpable mental state
is specified in the felony murder provision, felony murder
arguably requires at least negligence.  But this is
speculation: There are no cases construing the
contemporary statutory language with respect to mental
culpability.
Colorado combines a nonpervasive negligence default
rule and a necessarily involved culpability rule.  Colorado’s
felony murder statute is unusual in that it punishes the
commission or attempt of enumerated dangerous felonies
when death “is caused” in furtherance of such a felony “by
anyone.” 178  It provides the New York affirmative defense
for accomplices who neither commit nor have reason to
foresee the killing.179  In addition, Colorado punishes as
177. See id. § 76-5-201:
Criminal homicide—Elements—Designations of offenses.
(1) (a) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state
otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense, causes the death of
another human being, including an unborn child.
(b) There shall be no cause of action for criminal homicide for the death of
an unborn child caused by an abortion.
(2) Criminal homicide is aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, child
abuse homicide, homicide by assault, negligent homicide, or automobile
homicide.
178. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-102 (West 1999):
Murder in the first degree.
(1) A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if: . . .
(b) Acting either alone or with one or more persons, he commits or attempts
to commit arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault in the first
or second degree as prohibited by section 18-3-402 or 18-3-403, or a class 3
felony for sexual assault on a child as provided in section 18-3-405 (2), or
the crime of escape as provided in section 18-8-208, and, in the course of or
in furtherance of the crime that he is committing or attempting to commit,
or of immediate flight therefrom, the death of a person, other than one of
the participants, is caused by anyone. . . .
179. See id. § 18-3-102:
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murder the distribution of drugs to a child that results in
the child’s death.180  Consistent with Colorado’s necessarily
involved rule, though not necessarily because of it,
Colorado’s courts employ a “proximate cause” standard of
causation in felony murder cases, according to which the
death must be the “natural and probable” consequence of
an enumerated dangerous felony and must not have
depended upon an “unforeseeable” “supervening cause”
independent of the felony.181  Overall, the legal framework
in Colorado closely resembles that in New York, despite the
fact that New York’s culpability default rule is pervasive
and Colorado’s is not.
The significant difference that nonpervasive default
rules make is that they permit resort to the transferred
intent version of the implied culpability stratagem.  This
feature of nonpervasive default rules for interpreting all
Murder in the first degree: (2) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of
violating subsection (1) (b) of this section that the defendant:
(a)  Was not the only participant in the underlying crime; and
(b) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request,
command, importune, cause, or aid the commission thereof; and
(c)  Was not armed with a deadly weapon; and
(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was
armed with such a weapon, instrument, article, or substance; and
(e)  Did not engage himself in or intend to engage in and had no reasonable
ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct
likely to result in death or serious bodily injury; and
(f)  Endeavored to disengage himself from the commission of the underlying
crime or flight therefrom immediately upon having reasonable grounds to
believe that another participant is armed with a deadly weapon,
instrument, article, or substance, or intended to engage in conduct likely to
result in death or serious bodily injury.
180. See id. § 18-3-102:
Murder in the first degree.
(1) A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if : . . . 
(e) He or she commits unlawful distribution, dispensation, or sale of a
controlled substance to a person under the age of eighteen years on school
grounds as provided in section 18-18-407 (2), and the death of such person
is caused by the use of such controlled substance. . . .
181. See People v. Calvaresi, 534 P.2d 316 (Colo. 1975) (articulating
supervening cause standard); People v. Bowman 669 P.2d 1369 (Colo. 1983)
(applying standard to felony murder).
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offense definitions seems less relevant in a jurisdiction like
Utah, however, that also has a homicide default rule.
D.  Summary of  Default Rules in the Courts
What patterns emerge from this review of felony
murder cases in default rule states?  The most striking
pattern is the rarity of any reference to, or reliance upon,
the default rules in construing felony murder provisions
that are silent as to mens rea.  Only Texas has a developed
body of jurisprudence regarding the applicability of these
default rules.  And even in Texas, where courts have
acknowledged the applicability of the default rules, they
appear to have systematically subverted or misunderstood
these default rules and reverted to the idea of transferred
intent.  Outside of Texas, the only other state judiciary to
have explicitly confronted the default rules is New Jersey,
where the Court found a legislative intent to impose strict
liability.  Neither Texas nor New Jersey have explicitly
acknowledged the applicability of their homicide default
rules.  By contrast, Pennsylvania courts have upheld a jury
instruction based on the homicide default rule, but ignored
the applicability of a general recklessness default rule.  An
Ohio court has explicitly considered the applicability of a
general default rule to felony manslaughter, but, like
Texas, it has subverted that rule by perpetuating the
archaic notion of transferred intent.  Presumably, the Ohio
courts will apply this approach to felony murder.
Courts in five other states—Illinois, Missouri, Alaska,
Oregon, and Kansas—have opined on the mental element
of felony murder, without referring to the default rules.
Like courts in Texas and Ohio, Kansas courts relied on the
notion of transferred intent.  But like the most recent
Rodriguez decision in Texas, Kansas courts have also relied
on the argument that the dangerousness of the predicate
felony supplies culpability. Courts in New York and
Colorado have considered the culpability required for felony
murder only indirectly, under the rubric of proximate
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causation of death.  Courts in North Dakota, Delaware,182
Alabama, and Utah have never considered whether
culpability is required for felony murder offenses.
Courts in Illinois, Alaska, and Alabama have been
spared a confrontation with the default rules by legislative
commentaries that clarified legislative intent with respect
to the mental element of felony murder.  All three
legislative comments may be read as expressions of the
argument that a dangerous predicate felony implies the
culpability with respect to death demanded by a pervasive
culpability requirement, although Alaska’s may also be
read simply as an expression of legislative intent to impose
strict liability for deaths caused by dangerous felonies.
CONCLUSION
The Model Penal Code conditions felony murder on
gross recklessness, rebuttably implied by causing death in
the course of a dangerous felony.  This explicit requirement
of recklessness flows from the Model Penal Code’s overall
culpability scheme which requires culpability with respect
to every objective element for all serious offenses and which
makes recklessness the default culpable mental state.
While half of the states have adopted some version of the
Model Penal Code’s default culpability rules, however, very
few states have adopted its felony murder provision.  Yet
this does not necessarily mean that they have utterly
rejected the Model Penal Code approach to felony murder,
since faithful application of the default rules to a
traditional felony murder provision yields substantially the
same regime.
A large number of legislatures—or code drafting
commissions—appear to have noticed the applicability of
default rules to felony murder provisions.  Montana
explicitly exempted felony murder from its default rules.
Hawaii, a recklessness default state, required intent for all
182. This claim is limited to Delaware’s escape-murder provision which, unlike
its regular felony murder provision, contains no mens rea term.
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murder.  Arkansas, another recklessness default state,
required at least gross recklessness.  Delaware, a
recklessness default state, required negligence for felony
murder (excepting its escape murder provision), while
Tennessee first required recklessness and later declared
that killing in the course of enumerated dangerous felonies
would be a strict liability crime.  New Hampshire and
Kentucky, both negligence default states, required at least
gross recklessness for all murders, while Maine explicitly
imposed its default standard of negligence for felony
murder.  Legislative drafting commissions in Alaska,
Alabama, Illinois, and New Jersey addressed the issue in
commentaries rather than in the statutes themselves.  In
New Jersey, an intent default state, the drafting
commission characterized felony murder as a strict liability
offense.  In Alaska, a recklessness default state, the
drafting commission issued a more ambiguous statement
that could be read either as imposing strict liability or as
asserting that recklessness is implied in the commission of
dangerous felonies.  In Illinois, the drafting commission
found the default culpability standard of recklessness
implied in violent predicate felonies, and in Alabama a
drafting commission found the default standard of
negligence implied by dangerous felonies.
These extensive efforts to address the mental element
of felony murder show that code drafters often understood
that they were constructing systematic codes, governed by
principles of culpability and rules of interpretation.  And
these legislative efforts imply an understanding that the
default rules would apply to felony murder unless the
mental element of felony murder were specified either in
the code or its accompanying comments.  The performance
of the legislative drafting commissions yields another
pattern as well.  None of the codes or comments employs
the notion of transferred intent in connection with felony
murder.
By contrast, courts have shown little awareness that
the new codes require application of the default rules to
offense definitions that are silent with respect to
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culpability.  Courts in only four states have referred to the
default rules in determining the mental element of the
offense of killing in the course of a felony and two of these
have subverted the default rules by invoking the outmoded
concept of transferred intent.
It may be that judicial application of the default rules
would seldom make a difference, because they would
seldom require more than negligence in states that have
not legislatively defined the mental element of felony
murder.
Only nine states have default rules requiring
recklessness or intent that are clearly pervasive.183  In
seven of these nine states, the mental element of felony
murder has been legislatively determined, either in the
statute or in an accompanying commentary—though of
course these commentaries themselves require
interpretation.  The two exceptions are North Dakota,
whose courts have not yet considered the question; and
Pennsylvania, one of whose courts has plausibly treated
felony murder as a species of criminal homicide requiring
negligence.
The remaining states have either default rules that
courts could interpret as nonpervasive or negligence
default rules.  In states with nonpervasive default rules,
courts could argue that the requisite culpability was
supplied by the predicate felony, perhaps on a traditional
“transferred intent” theory.  In states with negligence
default rules, courts could argue that the requisite
culpability was supplied by an inherently dangerous
predicate felony or a dangerous act committed in the course
of a felony.  Since most states limit felony murder to
dangerous felonies anyway, application of a negligence
default rule would make little difference.
Thus, application of the default rules might work little
change in the law of felony murder in most jurisdictions.
Nevertheless it would make a difference in some.  In North
183. Arkansas, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee.
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Dakota, for example, faithful application of the default
rules would predicate felony murder on reckless causation
of death.  The same result would apply to escape murder in
Delaware.  Arguably, even a nonpervasive recklessness or
intent default rule—like the ones in Kansas, Ohio, and
Texas—should be applied to causing death in the course of
a felony.  A mens rea default rule is supposed to clarify the
mental element of offenses. That was a major purpose of
the Model Penal Code’s culpability scheme, which rejected
the confusing language of “transferred” or “general” intent.
Yet a scheme of default rules cannot serve this purpose of
clarification unless it defines the mental culpability
required for each offense element.  Courts in Kansas, Ohio,
and Texas should construe their Code’s ambiguous default
rules to apply pervasively, to every element, including
causation of death in felony murder.  These courts should
eschew the language of transferred intent, which has no
place in construing a Model Penal Code inspired penal law.
If the legislatures of these states do not wish to condition
felony murder on recklessness or intent, they can specify
the mental element of felony murder in their states’ codes.
Missouri poses a more complicated case.  Its default
rule scheme defines the culpability attending every
element, but requires that when culpable mental states are
explicitly assigned to some elements, all other elements are
strict liability.  Yet, as the example of felony murder
demonstrates, this scheme cannot achieve clarity because
there are not always clear boundaries between offense
definitions.  Because Missouri does not condition felony
murder on dangerous predicate felonies, it should condition
felony murder on some form of culpability.  Therefore, the
Missouri courts should construe felony murder as a
separate offense that is silent as to culpability.  Such an
offense requires application of the default culpable mental
state of knowledge to all elements.  If the legislature is
unhappy with this result, it should revise the felony
murder statute to condition felony murder on negligently or
recklessly causing death in the commission or attempt of a
felony dangerous to life.
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In states that combine negligence default rules with
inherent dangerousness limitations on predicate felonies,
applying the default rules would require no change in the
law.  Nevertheless, doing so would serve two useful
purposes.  First, it would remind the legislature, the public,
and other courts, that mens rea default rules constitute an
integral and authoritative part of a code and determine the
meaning of its provisions.  Second, applying such default
rules to felony murder provisions would help clarify the
nature of the modern offense of felony murder as a crime of
culpability, conditioned on carelessly imposing a risk of
death on others in the pursuit of felonious ends. Explicit
application of the mens rea default rules would help lay to
rest the persistent myth that felony murder is a crime of
strict liability.
Mens rea default rules are the law.  Courts should
apply them explicitly.  Doing so will better communicate
the meanings of criminal code provisions to lawmakers and
the electorate  In turn, this will provoke the electorate and
their representatives to communicate more clearly to the
courts the criminal laws that they would like enforced.
